November 2022 - crux-commits

ports/opt (3.7): unzip: -> 6.0
by crux＠crux.nu 14 Nov '22

14 Nov '22

commit 954b187fb0a5078d12eac46c11da4c11ba49add7 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Mon Nov 14 17:25:07 2022 +0000 unzip: -> 6.0 diff --git a/unzip/.signature b/unzip/.signature index f7d291eac..300c682c9 100644 --- a/unzip/.signature +++ b/unzip/.signature @@ -1,14 +1,7 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub -RWSE3ohX2g5d/R7O45474ZQ+K45Hf9/iDhigZ4Baf/L0OHwJIGYHlZZhSQSu3EZRX5/Zw4rGAxHwaPpyGKX6jX3bixZSrOpUoww= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 16eadedbcb7d94a93429ef704f7fcd31c2a213343b9837ac2e2359f9aaac8f1e +RWSE3ohX2g5d/RuvXYvJhKL6u25H66hnRE7em9kKl1KEHlcgQKMomFIE34UIsoFHju8QMOUBOibNw2WjWUsVEDOo/emdS5IyDQQ= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = e8289fa1c583afdcd46d442f966257f90a6d75f272fdf687fe48743f0058e46b SHA256 (.footprint) = a1d2c71a5371982b87a8a14082aa2236258f84e0d602ec39247e0d63bf46ffdd SHA256 (unzip60.tar.gz) = 036d96991646d0449ed0aa952e4fbe21b476ce994abc276e49d30e686708bd37 -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-overflow.patch) = dcd41e0be383c485427fc5461a1aeb8a6207e7fcacf0d254f18700599845a9da -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch) = 74bc961e8013a4058687a3730590a709b7889203beb74a4a8369ba0301bef0e2 -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch) = b072c5a6d252425dbbda54a3d94285e4fb9aca122a0b9f8aa8f0f12ae505e64f -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch) = 337131428f491b7030f96ee5b8ef3d8f5963730d1619b2754c624f4616d79adb -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch) = 64f64985270e026c01d2c19c6b66c218cf5bcfc7cf3d4a44e601fad41975ec73 -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch) = b7a14c33db93d1e5b4fc6ce113b4b99ff7a81ed56f46c87e001f22ec085e0273 -SHA256 (0001-Fix-CVE-2016-9844-rhbz-1404283.patch) = 1980d37c82591f9ad473052408b0a61d0c50cce8db795b9980e6a74b2270c339 -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-cve-2018-1000035-heap-based-overflow.patch) = aced0f27191a67f9b8b3fdc5995938a64fd87cea64a0bbba2106e06137ef91c2 -SHA256 (unzip-6.0-alt-iconv-utf8-print.patch) = b990d8d8d8e02777999484a132170666ea736a865f9ad81da651dc63725475ff +SHA256 (28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch) = a27efd8c4950fb3d942d602ad7846996e02aafd77a8ad1e26700e42ae6c1cd37 +SHA256 (cumulative.patch) = f4173a8e2a2eea7f537ef8919369c2b6bac43d9ccd05345755ac0d1457c24234 diff --git a/unzip/28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch b/unzip/28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8f5351e8c --- /dev/null +++ b/unzip/28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +From: Steven M. Schweda <sms(a)antinode.info> +Subject: Fix for CVE-2022-0529 and CVE-2022-0530 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1010355 +X-Debian-version: 6.0-27 + +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -171,8 +171,10 @@ + static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] = + "warning: filename too long--truncating.\n"; + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT ++ static ZCONST char Far UFilenameCorrupt[] = ++ "error: Unicode filename corrupt.\n"; + static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] = +- "warning: Converted unicode filename too long--truncating.\n"; ++ "warning: Converted Unicode filename too long--truncating.\n"; + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; +@@ -2361,16 +2363,30 @@ + /* convert UTF-8 to local character set */ + fn = utf8_to_local_string(G.unipath_filename, + G.unicode_escape_all); +- /* make sure filename is short enough */ +- if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) { +- fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0'; ++ ++ /* 2022-07-22 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0530 ++ * Detect conversion failure, emit message. ++ * Continue with unconverted name. ++ */ ++ if (fn == NULL) ++ { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc))); +- error = PK_WARN; ++ LoadFarString(UFilenameCorrupt))); ++ error = PK_ERR; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* make sure filename is short enough */ ++ if (strlen(fn) >= FILNAMSIZ) { ++ fn[FILNAMSIZ - 1] = '\0'; ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(UFilenameTooLongTrunc))); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } ++ /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */ ++ strcpy(G.filename, fn); ++ free(fn); + } +- /* replace filename with converted UTF-8 */ +- strcpy(G.filename, fn); +- free(fn); + } + # endif /* UNICODE_WCHAR */ + if (G.unipath_filename != G.filename_full) +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ + "\nwarning: Unicode Path version > 1\n"; + static ZCONST char Far UnicodeMismatchError[] = + "\nwarning: Unicode Path checksum invalid\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far UFilenameTooLongTrunc[] = ++ "warning: filename too long (P1) -- truncating.\n"; + #endif + + +@@ -1915,7 +1917,7 @@ + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. + +- 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. (oCERT.org report.) CVE-2014-8141. + Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling + makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with + simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend +@@ -1947,9 +1949,10 @@ + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } ++ + if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) + { +- int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; ++ unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + + if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) + { +@@ -2046,7 +2049,7 @@ + } + if (eb_id == EF_UNIPATH) { + +- int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; ++ unsigned offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + ush ULen = eb_len - 5; + ulg chksum = CRCVAL_INITIAL; + +@@ -2504,16 +2507,17 @@ + int state_dependent; + int wsize = 0; + int max_bytes = MB_CUR_MAX; +- char buf[9]; ++ char buf[ MB_CUR_MAX+ 1]; /* ("+1" not really needed?) */ + char *buffer = NULL; + char *local_string = NULL; ++ size_t buffer_size; /* CVE-2022-0529 */ + + for (wsize = 0; wide_string[wsize]; wsize++) ; + + if (max_bytes < MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES) + max_bytes = MAX_ESCAPE_BYTES; +- +- if ((buffer = (char *)malloc(wsize * max_bytes + 1)) == NULL) { ++ buffer_size = wsize * max_bytes + 1; /* Reused below. */ ++ if ((buffer = (char *)malloc( buffer_size)) == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + +@@ -2551,8 +2555,28 @@ + } else { + /* no MB for this wide */ + /* use escape for wide character */ +- char *escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]); +- strcat(buffer, escape_string); ++ size_t buffer_len; ++ size_t escape_string_len; ++ char *escape_string; ++ int err_msg = 0; ++ ++ escape_string = wide_to_escape_string(wide_string[i]); ++ buffer_len = strlen( buffer); ++ escape_string_len = strlen( escape_string); ++ ++ /* Append escape string, as space allows. */ ++ /* 2022-07-18 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0529 */ ++ if (escape_string_len > buffer_size- buffer_len- 1) ++ { ++ escape_string_len = buffer_size- buffer_len- 1; ++ if (err_msg == 0) ++ { ++ err_msg = 1; ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( UFilenameTooLongTrunc))); ++ } ++ } ++ strncat( buffer, escape_string, escape_string_len); + free(escape_string); + } + } +@@ -2604,9 +2628,18 @@ + ZCONST char *utf8_string; + int escape_all; + { +- zwchar *wide = utf8_to_wide_string(utf8_string); +- char *loc = wide_to_local_string(wide, escape_all); +- free(wide); ++ zwchar *wide; ++ char *loc = NULL; ++ ++ wide = utf8_to_wide_string( utf8_string); ++ ++ /* 2022-07-25 SMS, et al. CVE-2022-0530 */ ++ if (wide != NULL) ++ { ++ loc = wide_to_local_string( wide, escape_all); ++ free( wide); ++ } ++ + return loc; + } + diff --git a/unzip/Pkgfile b/unzip/Pkgfile index 367286178..eab832b1a 100644 --- a/unzip/Pkgfile +++ b/unzip/Pkgfile @@ -1,31 +1,18 @@ # Description: Decompress utility for zipfiles -# URL: http://infozip.sourceforge.net/UnZip.html -# Maintainer: CRUX System Team, core-ports at crux dot nu +# URL: https://infozip.sourceforge.net/UnZip.html +# Maintainer: CRUX System Team, core-ports at crux dot nu name=unzip version=6.0 -release=7 -source=(http://downloads.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/infozip/${name}${version//./}.tar.gz - unzip-6.0-overflow.patch unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch - unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch - unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch - unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch - unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch - 0001-Fix-CVE-2016-9844-rhbz-1404283.patch - unzip-6.0-cve-2018-1000035-heap-based-overflow.patch - unzip-6.0-alt-iconv-utf8-print.patch) +release=8 +source=(https://downloads.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/infozip/${name}${version//./}.tar.gz + 28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch + cumulative.patch) build() { cd ${name}${version//./} - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-overflow.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8139.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8140.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-cve-2014-8141.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/0001-Fix-CVE-2016-9844-rhbz-1404283.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-cve-2018-1000035-heap-based-overflow.patch - patch -p1 -i $SRC/unzip-6.0-alt-iconv-utf8-print.patch + patch -Np1 -i $SRC/cumulative.patch + patch -p1 -F3 -i $SRC/28-cve-2022-0529-and-cve-2022-0530.patch sed -i 's/-O3//' unix/configure make -f unix/Makefile LOCAL_UNZIP="$CFLAGS" generic diff --git a/unzip/cumulative.patch b/unzip/cumulative.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6b42955e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/unzip/cumulative.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2714 @@ +diff -up unzip60/crc_i386.S.exec-shield unzip60/crc_i386.S +--- unzip60/crc_i386.S.exec-shield 2007-01-07 06:02:58.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/crc_i386.S 2009-11-18 11:16:39.630389312 +0100 +@@ -302,3 +302,6 @@ _crc32: /* ulg c + #endif /* i386 || _i386 || _I386 || __i386 */ + + #endif /* !USE_ZLIB && !CRC_TABLE_ONLY */ ++ ++.section .note.GNU-stack, "", @progbits ++.previous +diff -up unzip60/extract.c.close unzip60/extract.c +--- unzip60/extract.c.close 2009-03-14 02:32:52.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/extract.c 2009-11-19 08:17:23.481263496 +0100 +@@ -1924,24 +1924,21 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) + + #ifdef VMS /* VMS: required even for stdout! (final flush) */ + if (!uO.tflag) /* don't close NULL file */ +- close_outfile(__G); ++ error = close_outfile(__G); + #else + #ifdef DLL + if (!uO.tflag && (!uO.cflag || G.redirect_data)) { + if (G.redirect_data) + FINISH_REDIRECT(); + else +- close_outfile(__G); ++ error = close_outfile(__G); + } + #else + if (!uO.tflag && !uO.cflag) /* don't close NULL file or stdout */ +- close_outfile(__G); ++ error = close_outfile(__G); + #endif + #endif /* VMS */ + +- /* GRR: CONVERT close_outfile() TO NON-VOID: CHECK FOR ERRORS! */ +- +- + if (G.disk_full) { /* set by flush() */ + if (G.disk_full > 1) { + #if (defined(DELETE_IF_FULL) && defined(HAVE_UNLINK)) +diff -up unzip60/unix/unix.c.close unzip60/unix/unix.c +--- unzip60/unix/unix.c.close 2009-01-24 00:31:26.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/unix/unix.c 2009-11-19 08:33:25.568389171 +0100 +@@ -1096,10 +1096,41 @@ static int get_extattribs(__G__ pzt, z_u + #ifndef MTS + + /****************************/ ++/* Function CloseError() */ ++/***************************/ ++ ++int CloseError(__G) ++ __GDEF ++{ ++ int errval = PK_OK; ++ ++ if (fclose(G.outfile) < 0) { ++ switch (errno) { ++ case ENOSPC: ++ /* Do we need this on fileio.c? */ ++ Info(slide, 0x4a1, ((char *)slide, "%s: write error (disk full?). Continue? (y/n/^C) ", ++ FnFilter1(G.filename))); ++ fgets(G.answerbuf, 9, stdin); ++ if (*G.answerbuf == 'y') /* stop writing to this file */ ++ G.disk_full = 1; /* pass to next */ ++ else ++ G.disk_full = 2; /* no: exit program */ ++ ++ errval = PK_DISK; ++ break; ++ ++ default: ++ errval = PK_WARN; ++ } ++ } ++ return errval; ++} /* End of CloseError() */ ++ ++/****************************/ + /* Function close_outfile() */ + /****************************/ + +-void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: change to return PK-style warning level */ ++int close_outfile(__G) + __GDEF + { + union { +@@ -1108,6 +1139,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + } zt; + ulg z_uidgid[2]; + int have_uidgid_flg; ++ int errval = PK_OK; + + have_uidgid_flg = get_extattribs(__G__ &(zt.t3), z_uidgid); + +@@ -1141,16 +1173,16 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + Info(slide, 0x201, ((char *)slide, + "warning: symbolic link (%s) failed: mem alloc overflow\n", + FnFilter1(G.filename))); +- fclose(G.outfile); +- return; ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); ++ return errval ? errval : PK_WARN; + } + + if ((slnk_entry = (slinkentry *)malloc(slnk_entrysize)) == NULL) { + Info(slide, 0x201, ((char *)slide, + "warning: symbolic link (%s) failed: no mem\n", + FnFilter1(G.filename))); +- fclose(G.outfile); +- return; ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); ++ return errval ? errval : PK_WARN; + } + slnk_entry->next = NULL; + slnk_entry->targetlen = ucsize; +@@ -1174,10 +1206,10 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + "warning: symbolic link (%s) failed\n", + FnFilter1(G.filename))); + free(slnk_entry); +- fclose(G.outfile); +- return; ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); ++ return errval ? errval : PK_WARN; + } +- fclose(G.outfile); /* close "link" file for good... */ ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); /* close "link" file for good... */ + slnk_entry->target[ucsize] = '\0'; + if (QCOND2) + Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, "-> %s ", +@@ -1188,7 +1220,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + else + G.slink_head = slnk_entry; + G.slink_last = slnk_entry; +- return; ++ return errval; + } + #endif /* SYMLINKS */ + +@@ -1201,7 +1233,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + #endif + + #if (defined(NO_FCHOWN)) +- fclose(G.outfile); ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); + #endif + + /* if -X option was specified and we have UID/GID info, restore it */ +@@ -1227,7 +1259,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + } + + #if (!defined(NO_FCHOWN) && defined(NO_FCHMOD)) +- fclose(G.outfile); ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); + #endif + + #if (!defined(NO_FCHOWN) && !defined(NO_FCHMOD)) +@@ -1239,7 +1271,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + if (fchmod(fileno(G.outfile), filtattr(__G__ G.pInfo->file_attr))) + perror("fchmod (file attributes) error"); + +- fclose(G.outfile); ++ errval = CloseError(G.outfile, G.filename); + #endif /* !NO_FCHOWN && !NO_FCHMOD */ + + /* skip restoring time stamps on user's request */ +@@ -1267,6 +1299,7 @@ void close_outfile(__G) /* GRR: chang + #endif + #endif /* NO_FCHOWN || NO_FCHMOD */ + ++ return errval; + } /* end function close_outfile() */ + + #endif /* !MTS */ +diff -up unzip60/unzpriv.h.close unzip60/unzpriv.h +--- unzip60/unzpriv.h.close 2009-04-20 01:59:26.000000000 +0200 ++++ unzip60/unzpriv.h 2009-11-19 08:19:08.610388618 +0100 +@@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ char *GetLoadPath OF((__GPRO)); + int SetFileSize OF((FILE *file, zusz_t filesize)); /* local */ + #endif + #ifndef MTS /* macro in MTS */ +- void close_outfile OF((__GPRO)); /* local */ ++ int close_outfile OF((__GPRO)); /* local */ + #endif + #ifdef SET_SYMLINK_ATTRIBS + int set_symlnk_attribs OF((__GPRO__ slinkentry *slnk_entry)); /* local */ +diff -up unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow unzip60/zipinfo.c +--- unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow 2009-11-30 09:55:39.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/zipinfo.c 2009-11-30 09:56:42.844263244 +0100 +@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int zi_short(__G) /* return PK- + #endif + int k, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; + unsigned hostnum, hostver, methid, methnum, xattr; +- char *p, workspace[12], attribs[16]; ++ char *p, workspace[12], attribs[17]; + char methbuf[5]; + static ZCONST char dtype[5]="NXFS"; /* normal, maximum, fast, superfast */ + static ZCONST char Far os[NUM_HOSTS+1][4] = { +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index 1e9a1e1..905732b 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1751,6 +1751,12 @@ int process_cdir_file_hdr(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + = (G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag & (1 << 11)) == (1 << 11); + #endif + ++#ifdef SYMLINKS ++ /* Initialize the symlink flag, may be set by the platform-specific ++ mapattr function. */ ++ G.pInfo->symlink = 0; ++#endif ++ + return PK_COOL; + + } /* end function process_cdir_file_hdr() */ +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index eeb2f57..a0a4929 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + */ + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j + blknum*DIR_BLKSIZ + 1)); +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; + } + reached_end = TRUE; /* ...so no more left to do */ +@@ -752,8 +752,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + + #ifndef SFX + if (no_endsig_found) { /* just to make sure */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + if (!error_in_archive) /* don't overwrite stronger error */ + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; + } +diff --git a/list.c b/list.c +index 15e0011..f7359c3 100644 +--- a/list.c ++++ b/list.c +@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + } + } +@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive) + && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0) + ) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */ + } + +@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + } + } +@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */ + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + + if (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4)) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; + } + if (*nmember == 0L && error_in_archive <= PK_WARN) +diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c +index 6e22cc8..ac5c61b 100644 +--- a/zipinfo.c ++++ b/zipinfo.c +@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + Info(slide, 0x401, + ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j)); + Info(slide, 0x401, +- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */ + break; + } +@@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive) + && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0) + ) { /* just to make sure again */ +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg))); + error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */ + } + +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index ba0a1d0..03fc4be 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -2006,6 +2006,7 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-type error code */ + unsigned comment_bytes_left; + unsigned int block_len; + int error=PK_OK; ++ unsigned int length2; + #ifdef AMIGA + char tmp_fnote[2 * AMIGA_FILENOTELEN]; /* extra room for squozen chars */ + #endif +@@ -2292,8 +2293,12 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-type error code */ + seek_zipf(__G__ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart - G.extra_bytes + + (G.inptr-G.inbuf) + length); + } else { +- if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) ++ if ((length2 = readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length)) == 0) + return PK_EOF; ++ if(length2 < length) { ++ memset (__G__ (char *)G.extra_field+length2, 0 , length-length2); ++ length = length2; ++ } + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ + getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT +--- ./process.c.orig 2009-03-06 02:25:10.000000000 +0100 ++++ ./process.c 2013-09-12 10:51:16.000000000 +0200 +@@ -2901,9 +2901,9 @@ + */ + + #ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID +- if (eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN +- && z_uidgid != NULL +- && (*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1) ++ if ((eb_len >= EB_UX3_MINLEN) ++ && (z_uidgid != NULL) ++ && ((*((EB_HEADSIZE + 0) + ef_buf) == 1))) + /* only know about version 1 */ + { + uch uid_size; +@@ -2915,10 +2915,10 @@ + flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */ + + if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf, +- uid_size, z_uidgid[0]) ++ uid_size, &z_uidgid[0]) + && + read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 3) + ef_buf, +- gid_size, z_uidgid[1]) ) ++ gid_size, &z_uidgid[1]) ) + { + flags |= EB_UX2_VALID; /* signal success */ + } +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + ulg eb_ucsize; + uch *eb_ucptr; + int r; ++ ush method; + + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ +@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) + return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ + ++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); ++ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize)) ++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed ++ * should match in STORED ++ * method */ ++ + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT + (((ulg)(extent)eb_ucsize) != eb_ucsize) || +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 9ef80b3..c741b5f 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ char ZCONST Far TruncNTSD[] = + #ifndef SFX + static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ + EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEBlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ ++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n"; + static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] = + " invalid compressed data for EAs\n"; + # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS)) +@@ -2020,7 +2022,8 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len) + ebID = makeword(ef); + ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN); + +- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { ++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { + /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (uO.qflag) + Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", +@@ -2155,11 +2158,29 @@ static int TestExtraField(__G__ ef, ef_len) + } + break; + case EF_PKVMS: +- if (makelong(ef+EB_HEADSIZE) != +- crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ef+(EB_HEADSIZE+4), +- (extent)(ebLen-4))) +- Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ /* 2015-01-30 SMS. Added sufficient-bytes test/message ++ * here. (Removed defective ebLen test above.) ++ * ++ * If sufficient bytes (EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) are available, ++ * then compare the stored CRC value with the calculated ++ * CRC for the remainder of the data (and complain about ++ * a mismatch). ++ */ ++ if (ebLen < EB_PKVMS_MINLEN) ++ { ++ /* Insufficient bytes available. */ ++ Info( slide, 1, ++ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString( TooSmallEBlength), ++ ebLen, EB_PKVMS_MINLEN)); ++ } ++ else if (makelong(ef+ EB_HEADSIZE) != ++ crc32(CRCVAL_INITIAL, ++ (ef+ EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_PKVMS_MINLEN), ++ (extent)(ebLen- EB_PKVMS_MINLEN))) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(BadCRC_EAs))); ++ } + break; + case EF_PKW32: + case EF_PKUNIX: +diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index 005cee0..5c83a6e 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -1806,6 +1806,8 @@ + #define EB_NTSD_VERSION 4 /* offset of NTSD version byte */ + #define EB_NTSD_MAX_VER (0) /* maximum version # we know how to handle */ + ++#define EB_PKVMS_MINLEN 4 /* minimum data length of PKVMS extra block */ ++ + #define EB_ASI_CRC32 0 /* offset of ASI Unix field's crc32 checksum */ + #define EB_ASI_MODE 4 /* offset of ASI Unix permission mode field */ + + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index c741b5f..e4a4c7b 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2240,10 +2240,17 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata) + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ + ++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found: ++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size ++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.) ++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS. ++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold ++ * the compressed data header. ++ */ + if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) || +- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L && +- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) +- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ ++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) || ++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) ++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ + + method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset)); + if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize)) +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index 03fc4be..2a61a30 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTrunc[] = + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = ++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; + + #ifdef WINDLL + static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = +@@ -2300,7 +2302,13 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* return PK-type error code */ + length = length2; + } + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ +- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); ++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } ++ + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + G.unipath_filename = NULL; + if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) { +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index be6e006..0d57ab4 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1894,48 +1894,83 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + and a 4-byte version of disk start number. + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. ++ ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling ++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with ++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend ++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now ++ stay within the buffer. + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + ++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff ++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + + Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", + ef_len)); + +- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { ++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { + eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); + eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); + +- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { +- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ ++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ + Trace((stderr, + "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } +- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { + ++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) ++ { + int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + +- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); ++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); ++ ++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); ++ offset += 4; + } ++#if 0 ++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ ++#endif /* 0 */ + } + +- /* Skip this extra field block */ ++ /* Skip this extra field block. */ + ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + } +diff --git a/list.c b/list.c +index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644 +--- a/list.c ++++ b/list.c +@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + { + int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; + #ifndef WINDLL +- char sgn, cfactorstr[10]; ++ char sgn, cfactorstr[13]; + int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1); + #endif + int date_format; +@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) { + methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3]; + } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { +- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ /* 2013-02-26 SMS. ++ * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail ++ * &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786 ++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow ++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format ++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the ++ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal. ++ */ ++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } else { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } + } + + #if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */ +From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk(a)redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow + +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002 +--- + crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c +index 784e411..a8975f2 100644 +--- a/crypt.c ++++ b/crypt.c +@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd) + GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE; + defer_leftover_input(__G); + for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) { +- b = NEXTBYTE; ++ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.) ++ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting ++ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved, ++ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and ++ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See ++ * fileio.c:readbyte()). ++ */ ++ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF) ++ { ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + h[n] = (uch)b; + Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n])); + } +-- +2.4.6 + + +From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka(a)redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data + +Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/ +--- + extract.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 7134bfe..29db027 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF + int repeated_buf_err; + bz_stream bstrm; + ++ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) { ++ /* avoid an infinite loop */ ++ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n")); ++ return 2; ++ } ++ + #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR)) + if (G.redirect_slide) + wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer; +-- +2.4.6 + + +From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka(a)redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input + +Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius +--- + extract.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 29db027..b9ae667 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk, + if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) { + zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize; + +- if (G.pInfo->encrypted) ++ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) { ++ if (csiz_decrypted < 12) { ++ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */ ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile), ++ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData), ++ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate))); ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + csiz_decrypted -= 12; ++ } + if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff), +-- +2.5.2 + +From: Giovanni Scafora <giovanni.archlinux.org> +Subject: unzip files encoded with non-latin, non-unicode file names +Last-Update: 2015-02-11 + +Updated 2015-02-11 by Marc Deslauriers <marc.deslauriers(a)canonical.com> +to fix buffer overflow in charset_to_intern() + +Index: unzip-6.0/unix/unix.c +=================================================================== +--- unzip-6.0.orig/unix/unix.c 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 ++++ unzip-6.0/unix/unix.c 2015-02-11 09:18:04.902081319 -0500 +@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ + #define UNZIP_INTERNAL + #include "unzip.h" + ++#include <iconv.h> ++#include <langinfo.h> ++ + #ifdef SCO_XENIX + # define SYSNDIR + #else /* SCO Unix, AIX, DNIX, TI SysV, Coherent 4.x, ... */ +@@ -1874,3 +1877,102 @@ + } + } + #endif /* QLZIP */ ++ ++ ++typedef struct { ++ char *local_charset; ++ char *archive_charset; ++} CHARSET_MAP; ++ ++/* A mapping of local <-> archive charsets used by default to convert filenames ++ * of DOS/Windows Zip archives. Currently very basic. */ ++static CHARSET_MAP dos_charset_map[] = { ++ { "ANSI_X3.4-1968", "CP850" }, ++ { "ISO-8859-1", "CP850" }, ++ { "CP1252", "CP850" }, ++ { "UTF-8", "CP866" }, ++ { "KOI8-R", "CP866" }, ++ { "KOI8-U", "CP866" }, ++ { "ISO-8859-5", "CP866" } ++}; ++ ++char OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME] = ""; ++char ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME] = ""; ++ ++/* Try to guess the default value of OEM_CP based on the current locale. ++ * ISO_CP is left alone for now. */ ++void init_conversion_charsets() ++{ ++ const char *local_charset; ++ int i; ++ ++ /* Make a guess only if OEM_CP not already set. */ ++ if(*OEM_CP == '\0') { ++ local_charset = nl_langinfo(CODESET); ++ for(i = 0; i < sizeof(dos_charset_map)/sizeof(CHARSET_MAP); i++) ++ if(!strcasecmp(local_charset, dos_charset_map[i].local_charset)) { ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, dos_charset_map[i].archive_charset, ++ sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++} ++ ++/* Convert a string from one encoding to the current locale using iconv(). ++ * Be as non-intrusive as possible. If error is encountered during covertion ++ * just leave the string intact. */ ++static void charset_to_intern(char *string, char *from_charset) ++{ ++ iconv_t cd; ++ char *s,*d, *buf; ++ size_t slen, dlen, buflen; ++ const char *local_charset; ++ ++ if(*from_charset == '\0') ++ return; ++ ++ buf = NULL; ++ local_charset = nl_langinfo(CODESET); ++ ++ if((cd = iconv_open(local_charset, from_charset)) == (iconv_t)-1) ++ return; ++ ++ slen = strlen(string); ++ s = string; ++ ++ /* Make sure OUTBUFSIZ + 1 never ends up smaller than FILNAMSIZ ++ * as this function also gets called with G.outbuf in fileio.c ++ */ ++ buflen = FILNAMSIZ; ++ if (OUTBUFSIZ + 1 < FILNAMSIZ) ++ { ++ buflen = OUTBUFSIZ + 1; ++ } ++ ++ d = buf = malloc(buflen); ++ if(!d) ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ bzero(buf,buflen); ++ dlen = buflen - 1; ++ ++ if(iconv(cd, &s, &slen, &d, &dlen) == (size_t)-1) ++ goto cleanup; ++ strncpy(string, buf, buflen); ++ ++ cleanup: ++ free(buf); ++ iconv_close(cd); ++} ++ ++/* Convert a string from OEM_CP to the current locale charset. */ ++inline void oem_intern(char *string) ++{ ++ charset_to_intern(string, OEM_CP); ++} ++ ++/* Convert a string from ISO_CP to the current locale charset. */ ++inline void iso_intern(char *string) ++{ ++ charset_to_intern(string, ISO_CP); ++} +Index: unzip-6.0/unix/unxcfg.h +=================================================================== +--- unzip-6.0.orig/unix/unxcfg.h 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 ++++ unzip-6.0/unix/unxcfg.h 2015-02-11 08:46:43.671324260 -0500 +@@ -228,4 +228,30 @@ + /* wild_dir, dirname, wildname, matchname[], dirnamelen, have_dirname, */ + /* and notfirstcall are used by do_wild(). */ + ++ ++#define MAX_CP_NAME 25 ++ ++#ifdef SETLOCALE ++# undef SETLOCALE ++#endif ++#define SETLOCALE(category, locale) setlocale(category, locale) ++#include <locale.h> ++ ++#ifdef _ISO_INTERN ++# undef _ISO_INTERN ++#endif ++#define _ISO_INTERN(str1) iso_intern(str1) ++ ++#ifdef _OEM_INTERN ++# undef _OEM_INTERN ++#endif ++#ifndef IZ_OEM2ISO_ARRAY ++# define IZ_OEM2ISO_ARRAY ++#endif ++#define _OEM_INTERN(str1) oem_intern(str1) ++ ++void iso_intern(char *); ++void oem_intern(char *); ++void init_conversion_charsets(void); ++ + #endif /* !__unxcfg_h */ +Index: unzip-6.0/unzip.c +=================================================================== +--- unzip-6.0.orig/unzip.c 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 ++++ unzip-6.0/unzip.c 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 +@@ -327,11 +327,21 @@ + -2 just filenames but allow -h/-t/-z -l long Unix \"ls -l\" format\n\ + -v verbose, multi-page format\n"; + ++#ifndef UNIX + static ZCONST char Far ZipInfoUsageLine3[] = "miscellaneous options:\n\ + -h print header line -t print totals for listed files or for all\n\ + -z print zipfile comment -T print file times in sortable decimal format\ + \n -C be case-insensitive %s\ + -x exclude filenames that follow from listing\n"; ++#else /* UNIX */ ++static ZCONST char Far ZipInfoUsageLine3[] = "miscellaneous options:\n\ ++ -h print header line -t print totals for listed files or for all\n\ ++ -z print zipfile comment %c-T%c print file times in sortable decimal format\ ++\n %c-C%c be case-insensitive %s\ ++ -x exclude filenames that follow from listing\n\ ++ -O CHARSET specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\ ++ -I CHARSET specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n"; ++#endif /* !UNIX */ + #ifdef MORE + static ZCONST char Far ZipInfoUsageLine4[] = + " -M page output through built-in \"more\"\n"; +@@ -664,6 +674,17 @@ + -U use escapes for all non-ASCII Unicode -UU ignore any Unicode fields\n\ + -C match filenames case-insensitively -L make (some) names \ + lowercase\n %-42s -V retain VMS version numbers\n%s"; ++#elif (defined UNIX) ++static ZCONST char Far UnzipUsageLine4[] = "\ ++modifiers:\n\ ++ -n never overwrite existing files -q quiet mode (-qq => quieter)\n\ ++ -o overwrite files WITHOUT prompting -a auto-convert any text files\n\ ++ -j junk paths (do not make directories) -aa treat ALL files as text\n\ ++ -U use escapes for all non-ASCII Unicode -UU ignore any Unicode fields\n\ ++ -C match filenames case-insensitively -L make (some) names \ ++lowercase\n %-42s -V retain VMS version numbers\n%s\ ++ -O CHARSET specify a character encoding for DOS, Windows and OS/2 archives\n\ ++ -I CHARSET specify a character encoding for UNIX and other archives\n\n"; + #else /* !VMS */ + static ZCONST char Far UnzipUsageLine4[] = "\ + modifiers:\n\ +@@ -802,6 +823,10 @@ + #endif /* UNICODE_SUPPORT */ + + ++#ifdef UNIX ++ init_conversion_charsets(); ++#endif ++ + #if (defined(__IBMC__) && defined(__DEBUG_ALLOC__)) + extern void DebugMalloc(void); + +@@ -1335,6 +1360,11 @@ + argc = *pargc; + argv = *pargv; + ++#ifdef UNIX ++ extern char OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME]; ++ extern char ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME]; ++#endif ++ + while (++argv, (--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv == '-')) { + s = *argv + 1; + while ((c = *s++) != 0) { /* "!= 0": prevent Turbo C warning */ +@@ -1516,6 +1546,35 @@ + } + break; + #endif /* MACOS */ ++#ifdef UNIX ++ case ('I'): ++ if (negative) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: encodings can't be negated")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } else { ++ if(*s) { /* Handle the -Icharset case */ ++ /* Assume that charsets can't start with a dash to spot arguments misuse */ ++ if(*s == '-') { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ } else { /* -I charset */ ++ ++argv; ++ if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ s = *argv; ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ } ++ while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ ++ } ++ break; ++#endif /* ?UNIX */ + case ('j'): /* junk pathnames/directory structure */ + if (negative) + uO.jflag = FALSE, negative = 0; +@@ -1591,6 +1650,35 @@ + } else + ++uO.overwrite_all; + break; ++#ifdef UNIX ++ case ('O'): ++ if (negative) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: encodings can't be negated")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } else { ++ if(*s) { /* Handle the -Ocharset case */ ++ /* Assume that charsets can't start with a dash to spot arguments misuse */ ++ if(*s == '-') { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ } else { /* -O charset */ ++ ++argv; ++ if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -O argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ s = *argv; ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ } ++ while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ ++ } ++ break; ++#endif /* ?UNIX */ + case ('p'): /* pipes: extract to stdout, no messages */ + if (negative) { + uO.cflag = FALSE; +Index: unzip-6.0/unzpriv.h +=================================================================== +--- unzip-6.0.orig/unzpriv.h 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 ++++ unzip-6.0/unzpriv.h 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 +@@ -3008,7 +3008,7 @@ + !(((islochdr) || (isuxatt)) && \ + ((hostver) == 25 || (hostver) == 26 || (hostver) == 40))) || \ + (hostnum) == FS_HPFS_ || \ +- ((hostnum) == FS_NTFS_ && (hostver) == 50)) { \ ++ ((hostnum) == FS_NTFS_ /* && (hostver) == 50 */ )) { \ + _OEM_INTERN((string)); \ + } else { \ + _ISO_INTERN((string)); \ +Index: unzip-6.0/zipinfo.c +=================================================================== +--- unzip-6.0.orig/zipinfo.c 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 ++++ unzip-6.0/zipinfo.c 2015-02-11 08:46:43.675324290 -0500 +@@ -457,6 +457,10 @@ + int tflag_slm=TRUE, tflag_2v=FALSE; + int explicit_h=FALSE, explicit_t=FALSE; + ++#ifdef UNIX ++ extern char OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME]; ++ extern char ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME]; ++#endif + + #ifdef MACOS + uO.lflag = LFLAG; /* reset default on each call */ +@@ -501,6 +505,35 @@ + uO.lflag = 0; + } + break; ++#ifdef UNIX ++ case ('I'): ++ if (negative) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: encodings can't be negated")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } else { ++ if(*s) { /* Handle the -Icharset case */ ++ /* Assume that charsets can't start with a dash to spot arguments misuse */ ++ if(*s == '-') { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ } else { /* -I charset */ ++ ++argv; ++ if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ s = *argv; ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ } ++ while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ ++ } ++ break; ++#endif /* ?UNIX */ + case 'l': /* longer form of "ls -l" type listing */ + if (negative) + uO.lflag = -2, negative = 0; +@@ -521,6 +554,35 @@ + G.M_flag = TRUE; + break; + #endif ++#ifdef UNIX ++ case ('O'): ++ if (negative) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: encodings can't be negated")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } else { ++ if(*s) { /* Handle the -Ocharset case */ ++ /* Assume that charsets can't start with a dash to spot arguments misuse */ ++ if(*s == '-') { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ } else { /* -O charset */ ++ ++argv; ++ if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -O argument")); ++ return(PK_PARAM); ++ } ++ s = *argv; ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ } ++ while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ ++ } ++ break; ++#endif /* ?UNIX */ + case 's': /* default: shorter "ls -l" type listing */ + if (negative) + uO.lflag = -2, negative = 0; +From ca0212ba19b64488b9e8459a762c11ecd6e7d0bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk(a)redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:56:11 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] print correctly non-ascii filenames + +--- + extract.c | 289 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + unzpriv.h | 7 ++ + 2 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 0ee4e93..741b7e0 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -2648,8 +2648,21 @@ static void set_deferred_symlink(__G__ slnk_entry) + } /* end function set_deferred_symlink() */ + #endif /* SYMLINKS */ + ++/* ++ * If Unicode is supported, assume we have what we need to do this ++ * check using wide characters, avoiding MBCS issues. ++ */ + +- ++#ifndef UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR ++ /* A convenient choice for the replacement of unprintable char codes is ++ * the "single char wildcard", as this character is quite unlikely to ++ * appear in filenames by itself. The following default definition ++ * sets the replacement char to a question mark as the most common ++ * "single char wildcard"; this setting should be overridden in the ++ * appropiate system-specific configuration header when needed. ++ */ ++# define UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR '?' ++#endif + + /*************************/ + /* Function fnfilter() */ /* here instead of in list.c for SFX */ +@@ -2661,48 +2674,168 @@ char *fnfilter(raw, space, size) /* convert name to safely printable form */ + extent size; + { + #ifndef NATIVE /* ASCII: filter ANSI escape codes, etc. */ +- ZCONST uch *r=(ZCONST uch *)raw; ++ ZCONST uch *r; // =(ZCONST uch *)raw; + uch *s=space; + uch *slim=NULL; + uch *se=NULL; + int have_overflow = FALSE; + +- if (size > 0) { +- slim = space + size +-#ifdef _MBCS +- - (MB_CUR_MAX - 1) +-#endif +- - 4; ++# if defined( UNICODE_SUPPORT) && defined( _MBCS) ++/* If Unicode support is enabled, and we have multi-byte characters, ++ * then do the isprint() checks by first converting to wide characters ++ * and checking those. This avoids our having to parse multi-byte ++ * characters for ourselves. After the wide-char replacements have been ++ * made, the wide string is converted back to the local character set. ++ */ ++ wchar_t *wstring; /* wchar_t version of raw */ ++ size_t wslen; /* length of wstring */ ++ wchar_t *wostring; /* wchar_t version of output string */ ++ size_t woslen; /* length of wostring */ ++ char *newraw; /* new raw */ ++ ++ /* 2012-11-06 SMS. ++ * Changed to check the value returned by mbstowcs(), and bypass the ++ * Unicode processing if it fails. This seems to fix a problem ++ * reported in the SourceForge forum, but it's not clear that we ++ * should be doing any Unicode processing without some evidence that ++ * the name actually is Unicode. (Check bit 11 in the flags before ++ * coming here?) ++ * http://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/bugs/40/ ++ */ ++ ++ if (MB_CUR_MAX <= 1) ++ { ++ /* There's no point to converting multi-byte chars if there are ++ * no multi-byte chars. ++ */ ++ wslen = (size_t)-1; + } +- while (*r) { +- if (size > 0 && s >= slim && se == NULL) { +- se = s; ++ else ++ { ++ /* Get Unicode wide character count (for storage allocation). */ ++ wslen = mbstowcs( NULL, raw, 0); ++ } ++ ++ if (wslen != (size_t)-1) ++ { ++ /* Apparently valid Unicode. Allocate wide-char storage. */ ++ wstring = (wchar_t *)malloc((wslen + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)); ++ if (wstring == NULL) { ++ strcpy( (char *)space, raw); ++ return (char *)space; + } +-#ifdef QDOS +- if (qlflag & 2) { +- if (*r == '/' || *r == '.') { ++ wostring = (wchar_t *)malloc(2 * (wslen + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)); ++ if (wostring == NULL) { ++ free(wstring); ++ strcpy( (char *)space, raw); ++ return (char *)space; ++ } ++ ++ /* Convert the multi-byte Unicode to wide chars. */ ++ wslen = mbstowcs(wstring, raw, wslen + 1); ++ ++ /* Filter the wide-character string. */ ++ fnfilterw( wstring, wostring, (2 * (wslen + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t))); ++ ++ /* Convert filtered wide chars back to multi-byte. */ ++ woslen = wcstombs( NULL, wostring, 0); ++ if ((newraw = malloc(woslen + 1)) == NULL) { ++ free(wstring); ++ free(wostring); ++ strcpy( (char *)space, raw); ++ return (char *)space; ++ } ++ woslen = wcstombs( newraw, wostring, (woslen * MB_CUR_MAX) + 1); ++ ++ if (size > 0) { ++ slim = space + size - 4; ++ } ++ r = (ZCONST uch *)newraw; ++ while (*r) { ++ if (size > 0 && s >= slim && se == NULL) { ++ se = s; ++ } ++# ifdef QDOS ++ if (qlflag & 2) { ++ if (*r == '/' || *r == '.') { ++ if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { ++ have_overflow = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++r; ++ *s++ = '_'; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } else ++# endif ++ { + if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { + have_overflow = TRUE; + break; + } +- ++r; +- *s++ = '_'; +- continue; ++ *s++ = *r++; + } +- } else ++ } ++ if (have_overflow) { ++ strcpy((char *)se, "..."); ++ } else { ++ *s = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ free(wstring); ++ free(wostring); ++ free(newraw); ++ } ++ else ++# endif /* defined( UNICODE_SUPPORT) && defined( _MBCS) */ ++ { ++ /* No Unicode support, or apparently invalid Unicode. */ ++ r = (ZCONST uch *)raw; ++ ++ if (size > 0) { ++ slim = space + size ++#ifdef _MBCS ++ - (MB_CUR_MAX - 1) ++#endif ++ - 4; ++ } ++ while (*r) { ++ if (size > 0 && s >= slim && se == NULL) { ++ se = s; ++ } ++#ifdef QDOS ++ if (qlflag & 2) { ++ if (*r == '/' || *r == '.') { ++ if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { ++ have_overflow = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++r; ++ *s++ = '_'; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } else + #endif + #ifdef HAVE_WORKING_ISPRINT +-# ifndef UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR +- /* A convenient choice for the replacement of unprintable char codes is +- * the "single char wildcard", as this character is quite unlikely to +- * appear in filenames by itself. The following default definition +- * sets the replacement char to a question mark as the most common +- * "single char wildcard"; this setting should be overridden in the +- * appropiate system-specific configuration header when needed. +- */ +-# define UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR '?' +-# endif +- if (!isprint(*r)) { ++ if (!isprint(*r)) { ++ if (*r < 32) { ++ /* ASCII control codes are escaped as "^{letter}". */ ++ if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-4)))) { ++ have_overflow = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ *s++ = '^', *s++ = (uch)(64 + *r++); ++ } else { ++ /* Other unprintable codes are replaced by the ++ * placeholder character. */ ++ if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { ++ have_overflow = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ *s++ = UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR; ++ INCSTR(r); ++ } ++#else /* !HAVE_WORKING_ISPRINT */ + if (*r < 32) { + /* ASCII control codes are escaped as "^{letter}". */ + if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-4)))) { +@@ -2710,47 +2843,30 @@ char *fnfilter(raw, space, size) /* convert name to safely printable form */ + break; + } + *s++ = '^', *s++ = (uch)(64 + *r++); ++#endif /* ?HAVE_WORKING_ISPRINT */ + } else { +- /* Other unprintable codes are replaced by the +- * placeholder character. */ ++#ifdef _MBCS ++ unsigned i = CLEN(r); ++ if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-i-2)))) { ++ have_overflow = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } ++ for (; i > 0; i--) ++ *s++ = *r++; ++#else + if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { + have_overflow = TRUE; + break; + } +- *s++ = UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR; +- INCSTR(r); +- } +-#else /* !HAVE_WORKING_ISPRINT */ +- if (*r < 32) { +- /* ASCII control codes are escaped as "^{letter}". */ +- if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-4)))) { +- have_overflow = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- *s++ = '^', *s++ = (uch)(64 + *r++); +-#endif /* ?HAVE_WORKING_ISPRINT */ +- } else { +-#ifdef _MBCS +- unsigned i = CLEN(r); +- if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-i-2)))) { +- have_overflow = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- for (; i > 0; i--) + *s++ = *r++; +-#else +- if (se != NULL && (s > (space + (size-3)))) { +- have_overflow = TRUE; +- break; +- } +- *s++ = *r++; + #endif +- } +- } +- if (have_overflow) { +- strcpy((char *)se, "..."); +- } else { +- *s = '\0'; ++ } ++ } ++ if (have_overflow) { ++ strcpy((char *)se, "..."); ++ } else { ++ *s = '\0'; ++ } + } + + #ifdef WINDLL +@@ -2772,6 +2888,53 @@ char *fnfilter(raw, space, size) /* convert name to safely printable form */ + } /* end function fnfilter() */ + + ++#if defined( UNICODE_SUPPORT) && defined( _MBCS) ++ ++/****************************/ ++/* Function fnfilter[w]() */ /* (Here instead of in list.c for SFX.) */ ++/****************************/ ++ ++/* fnfilterw() - Convert wide name to safely printable form. */ ++ ++/* fnfilterw() - Convert wide-character name to safely printable form. */ ++ ++wchar_t *fnfilterw( src, dst, siz) ++ ZCONST wchar_t *src; /* Pointer to source char (string). */ ++ wchar_t *dst; /* Pointer to destination char (string). */ ++ extent siz; /* Not used (!). */ ++{ ++ wchar_t *dsx = dst; ++ ++ /* Filter the wide chars. */ ++ while (*src) ++ { ++ if (iswprint( *src)) ++ { ++ /* Printable code. Copy it. */ ++ *dst++ = *src; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Unprintable code. Substitute something printable for it. */ ++ if (*src < 32) ++ { ++ /* Replace ASCII control code with "^{letter}". */ ++ *dst++ = (wchar_t)'^'; ++ *dst++ = (wchar_t)(64 + *src); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Replace other unprintable code with the placeholder. */ ++ *dst++ = (wchar_t)UZ_FNFILTER_REPLACECHAR; ++ } ++ } ++ src++; ++ } ++ *dst = (wchar_t)0; /* NUL-terminate the destination string. */ ++ return dsx; ++} /* fnfilterw(). */ ++ ++#endif /* defined( UNICODE_SUPPORT) && defined( _MBCS) */ + + + #ifdef SET_DIR_ATTRIB +diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index 22d3923..e48a652 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -1212,6 +1212,7 @@ + # ifdef UNICODE_WCHAR + # if !(defined(_WIN32_WCE) || defined(POCKET_UNZIP)) + # include <wchar.h> ++# include <wctype.h> + # endif + # endif + # ifndef _MBCS /* no need to include <locale.h> twice, see below */ +@@ -2410,6 +2411,12 @@ int memflush OF((__GPRO__ ZCONST uch *rawbuf, ulg size)); + char *fnfilter OF((ZCONST char *raw, uch *space, + extent size)); + ++# if defined( UNICODE_SUPPORT) && defined( _MBCS) ++wchar_t *fnfilterw OF((ZCONST wchar_t *src, wchar_t *dst, ++ extent siz)); ++#endif ++ ++ + /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + Decompression functions: + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +-- +2.4.3 + +From 754137e70cf58a64ad524b704a86b651ba0cde07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk(a)redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 16:30:36 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2016-9844 (rhbz#1404283) + +Fixes buffer overflow in zipinfo in similar way like fix for +CVE-2014-9913 provided by upstream. +--- + zipinfo.c | 14 +++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c +index c03620e..accca2a 100644 +--- a/zipinfo.c ++++ b/zipinfo.c +@@ -1984,7 +1984,19 @@ static int zi_short(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + ush dnum=(ush)((G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3); + methbuf[3] = dtype[dnum]; + } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) { /* unknown */ +- sprintf(&methbuf[1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ /* 2016-12-05 SMS. ++ * https://launchpad.net/bugs/1643750 ++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow ++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format ++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the "u", ++ * and use four-digit hexadecimal. ++ */ ++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 1], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } else { ++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 0], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method); ++ } ++ + } + + for (k = 0; k < 15; ++k) +-- +2.5.5 + +From: "Steven M. Schweda" <sms(a)antinode.info> +Subject: Do not ignore extra fields containing Unix Timestamps +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/842993 +X-Debian-version: 6.0-21 + +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -2914,10 +2914,13 @@ + break; + + case EF_IZUNIX2: +- if (have_new_type_eb == 0) { +- flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous IZUNIX field */ ++ if (have_new_type_eb == 0) { /* (< 1) */ + have_new_type_eb = 1; + } ++ if (have_new_type_eb <= 1) { ++ /* Ignore any prior (EF_IZUNIX/EF_PKUNIX) UID/GID. */ ++ flags &= 0x0ff; ++ } + #ifdef IZ_HAVE_UXUIDGID + if (have_new_type_eb > 1) + break; /* IZUNIX3 overrides IZUNIX2 e.f. block ! */ +@@ -2933,6 +2936,8 @@ + /* new 3rd generation Unix ef */ + have_new_type_eb = 2; + ++ /* Ignore any prior EF_IZUNIX/EF_PKUNIX/EF_IZUNIX2 UID/GID. */ ++ flags &= 0x0ff; + /* + Version 1 byte version of this extra field, currently 1 + UIDSize 1 byte Size of UID field +@@ -2953,8 +2958,6 @@ + uid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + 1) + ef_buf); + gid_size = *((EB_HEADSIZE + uid_size + 2) + ef_buf); + +- flags &= ~0x0ff; /* ignore any previous UNIX field */ +- + if ( read_ux3_value((EB_HEADSIZE + 2) + ef_buf, + uid_size, &z_uidgid[0]) + && +--- a/fileio.c 2014-12-05 05:06:05 -0600 ++++ b/fileio.c 2017-11-14 01:06:28 -0600 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2017 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1582,6 +1582,8 @@ + int r = IZ_PW_ENTERED; + char *m; + char *prompt; ++ char *ep; ++ char *zp; + + #ifndef REENTRANT + /* tell picky compilers to shut up about "unused variable" warnings */ +@@ -1590,9 +1592,12 @@ + + if (*rcnt == 0) { /* First call for current entry */ + *rcnt = 2; +- if ((prompt = (char *)malloc(2*FILNAMSIZ + 15)) != (char *)NULL) { +- sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), +- FnFilter1(zfn), FnFilter2(efn)); ++ zp = FnFilter1( zfn); ++ ep = FnFilter2( efn); ++ prompt = (char *)malloc( /* Slightly too long (2* "%s"). */ ++ sizeof( PasswPrompt)+ strlen( zp)+ strlen( ep)); ++ if (prompt != (char *)NULL) { ++ sprintf(prompt, LoadFarString(PasswPrompt), zp, ep); + m = prompt; + } else + m = (char *)LoadFarString(PasswPrompt2); +--- unzip60/list.c ++++ unzip60/list.c +@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type + { + int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL; + #ifndef WINDLL +- char sgn, cfactorstr[13]; ++ char sgn, cfactorstr[1+10+1+1]; /* <sgn><int>%NUL */ + int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1); + #endif + int date_format; +@@ -389,9 +389,9 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type + } + #else /* !WINDLL */ + if (cfactor == 100) +- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100)); ++ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100)); + else +- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor); ++ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor); + if (longhdr) + Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongHdrStats), + FmZofft(G.crec.ucsize, "8", "u"), methbuf, +@@ -471,9 +471,9 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type + + #else /* !WINDLL */ + if (cfactor == 100) +- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactor100)); ++ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactor100)); + else +- sprintf(cfactorstr, LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor); ++ snprintf(cfactorstr, sizeof(cfactorstr), LoadFarString(CompFactorStr), sgn, cfactor); + if (longhdr) { + Info(slide, 0, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(LongFileTrailer), + FmZofft(tot_ucsize, "8", "u"), FmZofft(tot_csize, "8", "u"), +From 06d1b08aef94984256cad3c5a54cedb10295681f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis(a)redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 09:31:18 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Possible unterminated string fix + +--- + unix/unix.c | 4 +++- + unix/unxcfg.h | 2 +- + unzip.c | 12 ++++++++---- + zipinfo.c | 12 ++++++++---- + 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/unix/unix.c b/unix/unix.c +index 59b622d..cd57f80 100644 +--- a/unix/unix.c ++++ b/unix/unix.c +@@ -1945,7 +1945,9 @@ void init_conversion_charsets() + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(dos_charset_map)/sizeof(CHARSET_MAP); i++) + if(!strcasecmp(local_charset, dos_charset_map[i].local_charset)) { + strncpy(OEM_CP, dos_charset_map[i].archive_charset, +- sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ ++ OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + break; + } + } +diff --git a/unix/unxcfg.h b/unix/unxcfg.h +index 8729de2..9ee8cfe 100644 +--- a/unix/unxcfg.h ++++ b/unix/unxcfg.h +@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ typedef struct stat z_stat; + /* and notfirstcall are used by do_wild(). */ + + +-#define MAX_CP_NAME 25 ++#define MAX_CP_NAME 25 + 1 + + #ifdef SETLOCALE + # undef SETLOCALE +diff --git a/unzip.c b/unzip.c +index 2d94a38..a485f2b 100644 +--- a/unzip.c ++++ b/unzip.c +@@ -1561,7 +1561,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); + return(PK_PARAM); + } +- strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } else { /* -I charset */ + ++argv; + if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { +@@ -1570,7 +1571,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + return(PK_PARAM); + } + s = *argv; +- strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } + while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ + } +@@ -1665,7 +1667,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); + return(PK_PARAM); + } +- strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } else { /* -O charset */ + ++argv; + if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { +@@ -1674,7 +1677,8 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + return(PK_PARAM); + } + s = *argv; +- strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } + while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ + } +diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c +index accca2a..cb7e08d 100644 +--- a/zipinfo.c ++++ b/zipinfo.c +@@ -519,7 +519,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); + return(PK_PARAM); + } +- strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } else { /* -I charset */ + ++argv; + if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { +@@ -528,7 +529,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + return(PK_PARAM); + } + s = *argv; +- strncpy(ISO_CP, s, sizeof(ISO_CP)); ++ strncpy(ISO_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ ISO_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } + while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ + } +@@ -568,7 +570,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + "error: a valid character encoding should follow the -I argument")); + return(PK_PARAM); + } +- strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } else { /* -O charset */ + ++argv; + if(!(--argc > 0 && *argv != NULL && **argv != '-')) { +@@ -577,7 +580,8 @@ int zi_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + return(PK_PARAM); + } + s = *argv; +- strncpy(OEM_CP, s, sizeof(OEM_CP)); ++ strncpy(OEM_CP, s, MAX_CP_NAME - 1); ++ OEM_CP[MAX_CP_NAME - 1] = '\0'; + } + while(*(++s)); /* No params straight after charset name */ + } +-- +2.14.5 + +From 41beb477c5744bc396fa1162ee0c14218ec12213 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 08:20:32 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in undefer_input() that misplaced the input state. + +--- + fileio.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/fileio.c b/fileio.c +index c042987..bc00d74 100644 +--- a/fileio.c ++++ b/fileio.c +@@ -530,8 +530,10 @@ void undefer_input(__G) + * This condition was checked when G.incnt_leftover was set > 0 in + * defer_leftover_input(), and it is NOT allowed to touch G.csize + * before calling undefer_input() when (G.incnt_leftover > 0) +- * (single exception: see read_byte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !! ++ * (single exception: see readbyte()'s "G.csize <= 0" handling) !! + */ ++ if (G.csize < 0L) ++ G.csize = 0L; + G.incnt = G.incnt_leftover + (int)G.csize; + G.inptr = G.inptr_leftover - (int)G.csize; + G.incnt_leftover = 0; +From 47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 22:01:18 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries. + +This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that +overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the +end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries +to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid +zip file is rejected. + +See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's +analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs. + +The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files +so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any +bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are +considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed +or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to +be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is +contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as +invalid. + +This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in +undefer_input() that misplaced the input state." +--- + extract.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + globals.c | 1 + + globals.h | 3 + + process.c | 11 ++++ + unzip.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 1acd769..0973a33 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -319,6 +319,125 @@ static ZCONST char Far UnsupportedExtraField[] = + "\nerror: unsupported extra-field compression type (%u)--skipping\n"; + static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] = + "error [%s]: bad extra-field CRC %08lx (should be %08lx)\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] = ++ "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] = ++ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n"; ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++/* A growable list of spans. */ ++typedef zoff_t bound_t; ++typedef struct { ++ bound_t beg; /* start of the span */ ++ bound_t end; /* one past the end of the span */ ++} span_t; ++typedef struct { ++ span_t *span; /* allocated, distinct, and sorted list of spans */ ++ size_t num; /* number of spans in the list */ ++ size_t max; /* allocated number of spans (num <= max) */ ++} cover_t; ++ ++/* ++ * Return the index of the first span in cover whose beg is greater than val. ++ * If there is no such span, then cover->num is returned. ++ */ ++static size_t cover_find(cover, val) ++ cover_t *cover; ++ bound_t val; ++{ ++ size_t lo = 0, hi = cover->num; ++ while (lo < hi) { ++ size_t mid = (lo + hi) >> 1; ++ if (val < cover->span[mid].beg) ++ hi = mid; ++ else ++ lo = mid + 1; ++ } ++ return hi; ++} ++ ++/* Return true if val lies within any one of the spans in cover. */ ++static int cover_within(cover, val) ++ cover_t *cover; ++ bound_t val; ++{ ++ size_t pos = cover_find(cover, val); ++ return pos > 0 && val < cover->span[pos - 1].end; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Add a new span to the list, but only if the new span does not overlap any ++ * spans already in the list. The new span covers the values beg..end-1. beg ++ * must be less than end. ++ * ++ * Keep the list sorted and merge adjacent spans. Grow the allocated space for ++ * the list as needed. On success, 0 is returned. If the new span overlaps any ++ * existing spans, then 1 is returned and the new span is not added to the ++ * list. If the new span is invalid because beg is greater than or equal to ++ * end, then -1 is returned. If the list needs to be grown but the memory ++ * allocation fails, then -2 is returned. ++ */ ++static int cover_add(cover, beg, end) ++ cover_t *cover; ++ bound_t beg; ++ bound_t end; ++{ ++ size_t pos; ++ int prec, foll; ++ ++ if (beg >= end) ++ /* The new span is invalid. */ ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* Find where the new span should go, and make sure that it does not ++ overlap with any existing spans. */ ++ pos = cover_find(cover, beg); ++ if ((pos > 0 && beg < cover->span[pos - 1].end) || ++ (pos < cover->num && end > cover->span[pos].beg)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* Check for adjacencies. */ ++ prec = pos > 0 && beg == cover->span[pos - 1].end; ++ foll = pos < cover->num && end == cover->span[pos].beg; ++ if (prec && foll) { ++ /* The new span connects the preceding and following spans. Merge the ++ following span into the preceding span, and delete the following ++ span. */ ++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = cover->span[pos].end; ++ cover->num--; ++ memmove(cover->span + pos, cover->span + pos + 1, ++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t)); ++ } ++ else if (prec) ++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the preceding span. Extend the end ++ of the preceding span. */ ++ cover->span[pos - 1].end = end; ++ else if (foll) ++ /* The new span is adjacent only to the following span. Extend the ++ beginning of the following span. */ ++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg; ++ else { ++ /* The new span has gaps between both the preceding and the following ++ spans. Assure that there is room and insert the span. */ ++ if (cover->num == cover->max) { ++ size_t max = cover->max == 0 ? 16 : cover->max << 1; ++ span_t *span = realloc(cover->span, max * sizeof(span_t)); ++ if (span == NULL) ++ return -2; ++ cover->span = span; ++ cover->max = max; ++ } ++ memmove(cover->span + pos + 1, cover->span + pos, ++ (cover->num - pos) * sizeof(span_t)); ++ cover->num++; ++ cover->span[pos].beg = beg; ++ cover->span[pos].end = end; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} + + + +@@ -374,6 +493,29 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + } + #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */ + ++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a ++ span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */ ++ if (G.cover == NULL) { ++ G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t)); ++ if (G.cover == NULL) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ return PK_MEM; ++ } ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL; ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0; ++ } ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, ++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory, ++ G.ziplen) != 0) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ return PK_MEM; ++ } ++ + /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di- + rectory lies at the end of the zipfile and the member files lie at the +@@ -591,7 +733,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + if (error > error_in_archive) + error_in_archive = error; + /* ...and keep going (unless disk full or user break) */ +- if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC) { ++ if (G.disk_full > 1 || error_in_archive == IZ_CTRLC || ++ error == PK_BOMB) { + /* clear reached_end to signal premature stop ... */ + reached_end = FALSE; + /* ... and cancel scanning the central directory */ +@@ -1060,6 +1203,11 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk, + + /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */ + request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes; ++ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ return PK_BOMB; ++ } + inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ; + bufstart = request - inbuf_offset; + +@@ -1591,6 +1739,18 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk, + return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */ + } + #endif ++ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request, ++ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf)); ++ if (error < 0) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ return PK_MEM; ++ } ++ if (error != 0) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ return PK_BOMB; ++ } + #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */ + UserStop(); + #endif +@@ -1992,6 +2152,34 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + } + + undefer_input(__G); ++ ++ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) { ++ /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature ++ * ambiguity) ++ */ ++# define SIG 0x08074b50 ++# define LOW 0xffffffff ++ uch buf[12]; ++ unsigned shy = 12 - readbuf((char *)buf, 12); ++ ulg crc = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf); ++ ulg clen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 4); ++ ulg ulen = shy ? 0 : makelong(buf + 8); /* or high clen if ZIP64 */ ++ if (crc == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ ++ (G.lrec.crc32 != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */ ++ (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ ++ ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */ ++ (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ ++ (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG ++ /* if not SIG, have signature */ ++ ))))) ++ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */ ++ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4); ++ if (G.zip64) ++ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */ ++ if (shy) ++ error = PK_ERR; ++ } ++ + return error; + + } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */ +diff --git a/globals.c b/globals.c +index fa8cca5..1e0f608 100644 +--- a/globals.c ++++ b/globals.c +@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ Uz_Globs *globalsCtor() + # if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS)) + uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */ + # endif ++ G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */ + #endif + + uO.lflag=(-1); +diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h +index 11b7215..2bdcdeb 100644 +--- a/globals.h ++++ b/globals.h +@@ -260,12 +260,15 @@ typedef struct Globals { + ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */ + z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */ + ++ int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */ ++ + int mem_mode; + uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */ + ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */ + int reported_backslash; /* extract.c static */ + int disk_full; + int newfile; ++ void **cover; /* used in extract.c for bomb detection */ + + int didCRlast; /* fileio static */ + ulg numlines; /* fileio static: number of lines printed */ +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index 1e9a1e1..d2e4dc3 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ void free_G_buffers(__G) /* releases all memory allocated in global vars */ + } + #endif + ++ /* Free the cover span list and the cover structure. */ ++ if (G.cover != NULL) { ++ free(*(G.cover)); ++ free(G.cover); ++ G.cover = NULL; ++ } ++ + } /* end function free_G_buffers() */ + + +@@ -1890,6 +1897,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + #define Z64FLGS 0xffff + #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff + ++ G.zip64 = FALSE; ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + +@@ -1927,6 +1936,8 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + #if 0 + break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ + #endif /* 0 */ ++ ++ G.zip64 = TRUE; + } + + /* Skip this extra field block. */ +diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h +index 5b2a326..ed24a5b 100644 +--- a/unzip.h ++++ b/unzip.h +@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ typedef struct _Uzp_cdir_Rec { + #define PK_NOZIP 9 /* zipfile not found */ + #define PK_PARAM 10 /* bad or illegal parameters specified */ + #define PK_FIND 11 /* no files found */ ++#define PK_BOMB 12 /* likely zip bomb */ + #define PK_DISK 50 /* disk full */ + #define PK_EOF 51 /* unexpected EOF */ + +From 6d351831be705cc26d897db44f878a978f4138fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2019 20:43:17 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Do not raise a zip bomb alert for a misplaced central + directory. + +There is a zip-like file in the Firefox distribution, omni.ja, +which is a zip container with the central directory placed at the +start of the file instead of after the local entries as required +by the zip standard. This commit marks the actual location of the +central directory, as well as the end of central directory records, +as disallowed locations. This now permits such containers to not +raise a zip bomb alert, where in fact there are no overlaps. +--- + extract.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ + process.c | 6 ++++++ + unzpriv.h | 10 ++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 0973a33..1b73cb0 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -493,8 +493,11 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + } + #endif /* !SFX || SFX_EXDIR */ + +- /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with a +- span that covers the central directory though the end of the file. */ ++ /* One more: initialize cover structure for bomb detection. Start with ++ spans that cover any extra bytes at the start, the central directory, ++ the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central ++ directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory ++ record, if present. */ + if (G.cover == NULL) { + G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t)); + if (G.cover == NULL) { +@@ -506,15 +509,25 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0; + } + ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; +- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, ++ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, + G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory, +- G.ziplen) != 0) { ++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory + ++ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, + LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); + return PK_MEM; + } ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || ++ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) || ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ return PK_BOMB; ++ } + + /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + The basic idea of this function is as follows. Since the central di- +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index d2e4dc3..d75d405 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1408,6 +1408,10 @@ static int find_ecrec64(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */ + + /* Now, we are (almost) sure that we have a Zip64 archive. */ + G.ecrec.have_ecr64 = 1; ++ G.ecrec.ec_start -= ECLOC64_SIZE+4; ++ G.ecrec.ec64_start = ecrec64_start_offset; ++ G.ecrec.ec64_end = ecrec64_start_offset + ++ 12 + makeint64(&byterec[ECREC64_LENGTH]); + + /* Update the "end-of-central-dir offset" for later checks. */ + G.real_ecrec_offset = ecrec64_start_offset; +@@ -1542,6 +1546,8 @@ static int find_ecrec(__G__ searchlen) /* return PK-class error */ + makelong(&byterec[OFFSET_START_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY]); + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length = + makeword(&byterec[ZIPFILE_COMMENT_LENGTH]); ++ G.ecrec.ec_start = G.real_ecrec_offset; ++ G.ecrec.ec_end = G.ecrec.ec_start + 22 + G.ecrec.zipfile_comment_length; + + /* Now, we have to read the archive comment, BEFORE the file pointer + is moved away backwards to seek for a Zip64 ECLOC64 structure. +diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index dc9eff5..297b3c7 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -2185,6 +2185,16 @@ typedef struct VMStimbuf { + int have_ecr64; /* valid Zip64 ecdir-record exists */ + int is_zip64_archive; /* Zip64 ecdir-record is mandatory */ + ush zipfile_comment_length; ++ zusz_t ec_start, ec_end; /* offsets of start and end of the ++ end of central directory record, ++ including if present the Zip64 ++ end of central directory locator, ++ which immediately precedes the ++ end of central directory record */ ++ zusz_t ec64_start, ec64_end; /* if have_ecr64 is true, then these ++ are the offsets of the start and ++ end of the Zip64 end of central ++ directory record */ + } ecdir_rec; + + +From 6fe72291a5563cdbcd2bdd87e36528537b7cdcfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis(a)redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 14:17:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] update the man page + +--- + man/unzip.1 | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/man/unzip.1 b/man/unzip.1 +index 21816d1..4d66073 100644 +--- a/man/unzip.1 ++++ b/man/unzip.1 +@@ -850,6 +850,8 @@ the specified zipfiles were not found. + invalid options were specified on the command line. + .IP 11 + no matching files were found. ++.IP 12 ++invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip-bomb). The zip-bomb checks can be disabled by using the UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=TRUE environment variable. + .IP 50 + the disk is (or was) full during extraction. + .IP 51 +-- +2.23.0 + +From 5e2efcd633a4a1fb95a129a75508e7d769e767be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:36:28 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in UZbunzip2() that incorrectly updated G.incnt. + +The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This +could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small +bzip2-compressed file was unzipped. This commit remedies that. +--- + extract.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index d9866f9..0cb7bfc 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -3010,7 +3010,7 @@ __GDEF + #endif + + G.inptr = (uch *)bstrm.next_in; +- G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr; /* reset for other routines */ ++ G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf; /* reset for other routines */ + + uzbunzip_cleanup_exit: + err = BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&bstrm); +From 5c572555cf5d80309a07c30cf7a54b2501493720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 21:39:09 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in UZinflate() that incorrectly updated G.incnt. + +The update assumed a full buffer, which is not always full. This +could result in a false overlapped element detection when a small +deflate-compressed file was unzipped using an old zlib. This +commit remedies that. +--- + inflate.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/inflate.c b/inflate.c +index 2f5a015..70e3cc0 100644 +--- a/inflate.c ++++ b/inflate.c +@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ int UZinflate(__G__ is_defl64) + G.dstrm.total_out)); + + G.inptr = (uch *)G.dstrm.next_in; +- G.incnt = (G.inbuf + INBUFSIZ) - G.inptr; /* reset for other routines */ ++ G.incnt -= G.inptr - G.inbuf; /* reset for other routines */ + + uzinflate_cleanup_exit: + err = inflateReset(&G.dstrm); +From 122050bac16fae82a460ff739fb1ca0f106e9d85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mark Adler <madler(a)alumni.caltech.edu> +Date: Sat, 2 Jan 2021 13:09:34 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Determine Zip64 status entry-by-entry instead of for entire + file. + +Fixes a bug for zip files with mixed Zip64 and not Zip64 entries, +which resulted in an incorrect data descriptor length. The bug is +seen when a Zip64 entry precedes a non-Zip64 entry, in which case +the data descriptor would have been assumed to be larger than it +is, resulting in an incorrect bomb warning due to a perceived +overlap with the next entry. This commit determines and saves the +Zip64 status for each entry based on the central directory, and +then computes the length of each data descriptor accordingly. +--- + extract.c | 5 +++-- + globals.h | 2 -- + process.c | 4 +--- + unzpriv.h | 1 + + 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 504afd6..878817d 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -658,6 +658,7 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + break; + } + } ++ G.pInfo->zip64 = FALSE; + if ((error = do_string(__G__ G.crec.extra_field_length, + EXTRA_FIELD)) != 0) + { +@@ -2187,12 +2188,12 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + (clen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ + ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */ + (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ +- (G.zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG ++ (G.pInfo->zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG + /* if not SIG, have signature */ + ))))) + /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */ + shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4); +- if (G.zip64) ++ if (G.pInfo->zip64) + shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */ + if (shy) + error = PK_ERR; +diff --git a/globals.h b/globals.h +index f9c6daf..a883c90 100644 +--- a/globals.h ++++ b/globals.h +@@ -261,8 +261,6 @@ typedef struct Globals { + ecdir_rec ecrec; /* used in unzip.c, extract.c */ + z_stat statbuf; /* used by main, mapname, check_for_newer */ + +- int zip64; /* true if Zip64 info in extra field */ +- + int mem_mode; + uch *outbufptr; /* extract.c static */ + ulg outsize; /* extract.c static */ +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index d75d405..d643c6f 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -1903,8 +1903,6 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + #define Z64FLGS 0xffff + #define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff + +- G.zip64 = FALSE; +- + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + +@@ -1943,7 +1941,7 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ + #endif /* 0 */ + +- G.zip64 = TRUE; ++ G.pInfo->zip64 = TRUE; + } + + /* Skip this extra field block. */ +diff --git a/unzpriv.h b/unzpriv.h +index 09f288e..75b3359 100644 +--- a/unzpriv.h ++++ b/unzpriv.h +@@ -2034,6 +2034,7 @@ typedef struct min_info { + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + unsigned GPFIsUTF8: 1; /* crec gen_purpose_flag UTF-8 bit 11 is set */ + #endif ++ unsigned zip64: 1; /* true if entry has Zip64 extra block */ + #ifndef SFX + char Far *cfilname; /* central header version of filename */ + #endif +From 5b44c818b96193b3e240f38f61985fa2bc780eb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Martisko <jamartis(a)redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 15:42:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add an option to disable the zipbomb detection + +This can be done by settting a newly introduced environment variable +UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION to {TRUE,True,true}. If the variable is unset, or +set to any other value the zipbomb detection is left enabled. + +Example: + UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=True unzip ./zbsm.zip -d ./test +--- + extract.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- + unzip.c | 15 ++++++++-- + unzip.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c +index 878817d..3e58071 100644 +--- a/extract.c ++++ b/extract.c +@@ -322,7 +322,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far BadExtraFieldCRC[] = + static ZCONST char Far NotEnoughMemCover[] = + "error: not enough memory for bomb detection\n"; + static ZCONST char Far OverlappedComponents[] = +- "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n"; ++ "error: invalid zip file with overlapped components (possible zip bomb)\n \ ++To unzip the file anyway, rerun the command with UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION=TRUE environmnent variable\n"; + + + +@@ -502,35 +503,37 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + the end of central directory record (including the Zip64 end of central + directory locator, if present), and the Zip64 end of central directory + record, if present. */ +- if (G.cover == NULL) { ++ if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) { ++ if (G.cover == NULL) { + G.cover = malloc(sizeof(cover_t)); + if (G.cover == NULL) { +- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); +- return PK_MEM; ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ return PK_MEM; + } + ((cover_t *)G.cover)->span = NULL; + ((cover_t *)G.cover)->max = 0; +- } +- ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; +- if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, +- G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory, +- G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory + +- G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) { ++ } ++ ((cover_t *)G.cover)->num = 0; ++ if (cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, ++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory, ++ G.extra_bytes + G.ecrec.offset_start_central_directory + ++ G.ecrec.size_central_directory) != 0) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); + return PK_MEM; +- } +- if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || +- (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 && +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start, +- G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) || +- cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start, +- G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) { ++ } ++ if ((G.extra_bytes != 0 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, 0, G.extra_bytes) != 0) || ++ (G.ecrec.have_ecr64 && ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec64_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec64_end) != 0) || ++ cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, G.ecrec.ec_start, ++ G.ecrec.ec_end) != 0) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); + return PK_BOMB; ++ } + } + + /*--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +@@ -1222,10 +1225,12 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk, + + /* seek_zipf(__G__ pInfo->offset); */ + request = G.pInfo->offset + G.extra_bytes; +- if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) { ++ if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) { ++ if (cover_within((cover_t *)G.cover, request)) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); + return PK_BOMB; ++ } + } + inbuf_offset = request % INBUFSIZ; + bufstart = request - inbuf_offset; +@@ -1758,17 +1763,19 @@ reprompt: + return IZ_CTRLC; /* cancel operation by user request */ + } + #endif +- error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request, +- G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf)); +- if (error < 0) { ++ if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) { ++ error = cover_add((cover_t *)G.cover, request, ++ G.cur_zipfile_bufstart + (G.inptr - G.inbuf)); ++ if (error < 0) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); ++ LoadFarString(NotEnoughMemCover))); + return PK_MEM; +- } +- if (error != 0) { ++ } ++ if (error != 0) { + Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, +- LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); ++ LoadFarString(OverlappedComponents))); + return PK_BOMB; ++ } + } + #ifdef MACOS /* MacOS is no preemptive OS, thus call event-handling by hand */ + UserStop(); +@@ -2171,8 +2178,8 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + } + + undefer_input(__G); +- +- if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) { ++ if (uO.zipbomb == TRUE) { ++ if ((G.lrec.general_purpose_bit_flag & 8) != 0) { + /* skip over data descriptor (harder than it sounds, due to signature + * ambiguity) + */ +@@ -2189,16 +2196,16 @@ static int extract_or_test_member(__G) /* return PK-type error code */ + ((G.lrec.csize & LOW) != SIG || /* if not SIG, have signature */ + (ulen == SIG && /* if not SIG, no signature */ + (G.pInfo->zip64 ? G.lrec.csize >> 32 : G.lrec.ucsize) != SIG +- /* if not SIG, have signature */ ++ /* if not SIG, have signature */ + ))))) +- /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */ +- shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4); ++ /* skip four more bytes to account for signature */ ++ shy += 4 - readbuf((char *)buf, 4); + if (G.pInfo->zip64) +- shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */ ++ shy += 8 - readbuf((char *)buf, 8); /* skip eight more for ZIP64 */ + if (shy) +- error = PK_ERR; ++ error = PK_ERR; ++ } + } +- + return error; + + } /* end function extract_or_test_member() */ +diff --git a/unzip.c b/unzip.c +index 8dbfc95..abb3644 100644 +--- a/unzip.c ++++ b/unzip.c +@@ -1329,10 +1329,9 @@ int uz_opts(__G__ pargc, pargv) + int *pargc; + char ***pargv; + { +- char **argv, *s; ++ char **argv, *s, *zipbomb_envar; + int argc, c, error=FALSE, negative=0, showhelp=0; + +- + argc = *pargc; + argv = *pargv; + +@@ -1923,6 +1922,18 @@ opts_done: /* yes, very ugly...but only used by UnZipSFX with -x xlist */ + else + G.extract_flag = TRUE; + ++ /* Disable the zipbomb detection, this is the only option set only via the shell variables but it should at least not clash with something in the future. */ ++ zipbomb_envar = getenv("UNZIP_DISABLE_ZIPBOMB_DETECTION"); ++ uO.zipbomb = TRUE; ++ if (zipbomb_envar != NULL) { ++ /* strcasecmp might be a better approach here but it is POSIX-only */ ++ if ((strcmp ("TRUE", zipbomb_envar) == 0) ++ || (strcmp ("True", zipbomb_envar) == 0) ++ || (strcmp ("true",zipbomb_envar) == 0)) { ++ uO.zipbomb = FALSE; ++ } ++ } ++ + *pargc = argc; + *pargv = argv; + return PK_OK; +diff --git a/unzip.h b/unzip.h +index ed24a5b..e7665e8 100644 +--- a/unzip.h ++++ b/unzip.h +@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ typedef struct _UzpOpts { + #ifdef UNIX + int cflxflag; /* -^: allow control chars in extracted filenames */ + #endif ++ int zipbomb; + #endif /* !FUNZIP */ + } UzpOpts; + +-- +2.33.0 + +diff --git a/process.c b/process.c +index d2a846e..cba2463 100644 +--- a/process.c ++++ b/process.c +@@ -2064,10 +2064,14 @@ int getUnicodeData(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + G.unipath_checksum = makelong(offset + ef_buf); + offset += 4; + ++ if (!G.filename_full) { ++ /* Check if we have a unicode extra section but no filename set */ ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } ++ + /* + * Compute 32-bit crc + */ +- + chksum = crc32(chksum, (uch *)(G.filename_full), + strlen(G.filename_full));

1 0

ports/core (3.7): libpipeline: 1.5.6 -> 1.5.7
by crux＠crux.nu 14 Nov '22

14 Nov '22

commit 292d196cd75ed86bea6ce1024e5ffa35409c9537 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Mon Nov 14 20:46:39 2022 +0000 libpipeline: 1.5.6 -> 1.5.7 diff --git a/libpipeline/.footprint b/libpipeline/.footprint index baf78669..189cdc86 100644 --- a/libpipeline/.footprint +++ b/libpipeline/.footprint @@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/include/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/include/pipeline.h drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/ -rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.la -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so -> libpipeline.so.1.5.6 -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so.1 -> libpipeline.so.1.5.6 --rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so.1.5.6 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so -> libpipeline.so.1.5.7 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so.1 -> libpipeline.so.1.5.7 +-rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libpipeline.so.1.5.7 drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/libpipeline.pc drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/ diff --git a/libpipeline/.signature b/libpipeline/.signature index 4f1c49f0..bb207099 100644 --- a/libpipeline/.signature +++ b/libpipeline/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeqiveNpx5vzXafzzNtp6QBDox68aYlcRCziTSe95S5a3VteUlrr+1RIASdbZzOTMfj4hR9u2HyVZemqER/Mxbjww= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 8e01da2c443f04494d70a2e9b9a7b06a2c6cf587543a9a92988a4d7ec31e3cb0 -SHA256 (.footprint) = 905ed799e4cf8e802c330e1b540bf3f63332d240aa992e8f8c2c0b8606f44718 -SHA256 (libpipeline-1.5.6.tar.gz) = 60fbb9e7dc398528e5f3a776af57bb28ca3fe5d9f0cd8a961ac6cebfe6e9b797 +RWRJc1FUaeVeqtUZQWfLrPmr8fpDvEQMB4VNZu/HQ9nIM8/WRAl+v/vxCC66B3gd+a24ohsYmLyUOdFiIBbMimPW4HlWRu8DfQ4= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 6548b636a8ea7d3b1d59d3e049e6f0f11c0b50e9ba4085e101322418317d4b82 +SHA256 (.footprint) = 71129cccb0ad80972840df8ccf0b88f6fccb250b4eb12ed1fbb6dda86581ac30 +SHA256 (libpipeline-1.5.7.tar.gz) = b8b45194989022a79ec1317f64a2a75b1551b2a55bea06f67704cb2a2e4690b0 diff --git a/libpipeline/Pkgfile b/libpipeline/Pkgfile index 243ae040..d06953b1 100644 --- a/libpipeline/Pkgfile +++ b/libpipeline/Pkgfile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: CRUX System Team, core-ports at crux dot nu name=libpipeline -version=1.5.6 +version=1.5.7 release=1 source=(http://download.savannah.gnu.org/releases/$name/$name-$version.tar.…

1 0

ports/core (3.7): xz: 5.2.7 -> 5.2.8
by crux＠crux.nu 14 Nov '22

14 Nov '22

commit 566b044fa6debe4f2dc06cc6771e9d3f0e49b875 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Mon Nov 14 20:46:37 2022 +0000 xz: 5.2.7 -> 5.2.8 diff --git a/xz/.footprint b/xz/.footprint index 8cc857f2..3fad0695 100644 --- a/xz/.footprint +++ b/xz/.footprint @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/include/lzma/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/liblzma.a -rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/liblzma.la -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so -> liblzma.so.5.2.7 -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so.5 -> liblzma.so.5.2.7 --rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so.5.2.7 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so -> liblzma.so.5.2.8 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so.5 -> liblzma.so.5.2.8 +-rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/liblzma.so.5.2.8 drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/liblzma.pc drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/ diff --git a/xz/.signature b/xz/.signature index ea4e2455..1fa30155 100644 --- a/xz/.signature +++ b/xz/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeqn19mM6ItmVtWMxaM70F5F/3aIBFV5LsQnOwp5wIMXh2+UugkTAuF07G1bQ8LHWekEWmFKhtlOYq/rE9pDPU8g4= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 21d825f967c34fd20f8921ed198daebec338825b05cc3e69123c8a3e31bff6ab -SHA256 (.footprint) = fc9c69c61af8bbc11f7b60e9a13b45d3c41052196599f41a9f9ceb0cda2929fb -SHA256 (xz-5.2.7.tar.xz) = 8712e9acb0b6b49a97d443458a3067dc5c08a025e02dc5f773176c51dd7cfc69 +RWRJc1FUaeVeqnBsSHvKvcCFimBhHJWkOUyo7sMEAro0SRkZZf1e7wGWBAfDI/CVArFTjS0WVFy6Baw6tDYZzadDU6HH5T4C5Ac= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = b781c08c7b8d3c1e44fa39b07e1fe5c49dd5a27856c1c9554edc4ec137224846 +SHA256 (.footprint) = 0bd18fa2cf21eb8daa996f97fcee4eefc4d8f50edf5ec868d0109a75c8347596 +SHA256 (xz-5.2.8.tar.xz) = 2424b2711b1d40d2129645d550363896c6853c97528f085f7765092fe68679d4 diff --git a/xz/Pkgfile b/xz/Pkgfile index 8965e7f1..28844b8e 100644 --- a/xz/Pkgfile +++ b/xz/Pkgfile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: CRUX System Team, core-ports at crux dot nu name=xz -version=5.2.7 +version=5.2.8 release=1 source=(https://tukaani.org/xz/$name-$version.tar.xz)

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ports/xorg (3.7): xorg-xkill: 1.0.5 -> 1.0.6
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit 16797087bdb2d5596e5b25a1a77019f0a9c54373 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 20:52:27 2022 +0000 xorg-xkill: 1.0.5 -> 1.0.6 diff --git a/xorg-xkill/.signature b/xorg-xkill/.signature index 9f9e7ad2..49697cce 100644 --- a/xorg-xkill/.signature +++ b/xorg-xkill/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/xorg.pub -RWTSGWF5Q7TndDHjamgdHjF84DkauciI/R1A4FNh2cdt3tAniuVfBT9RAGRHZ+UdKH/HMsiGB8BMomcaOLrfJxgrFcru+gnHTwA= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 6cd2c949f274e195d174a35930ecc0a0f5702ffdbb13acde20deaa0d68670b5e +RWTSGWF5Q7TndFfgrowfHgYZcpDSci+npyvBqO+/h8Bjysla3HYlJYJyBogwiAi0fjoxWC8DbRuSuBPiSzYIpswkDzkW+bYM9As= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 3d0724bc3b50e1dbdbbbb3381708c0b69d1a5e4caff9b4535bf5a78435975b13 SHA256 (.footprint) = cda9d6ab770146a9c51bce46990b62127bd4e3b324390852e2bc0236acfa0502 -SHA256 (xkill-1.0.5.tar.bz2) = c5f0bb6a95e1ac7c4def8a657496d5d2f21ccd41eb47ef2c9ccb03fb6d6aff6b +SHA256 (xkill-1.0.6.tar.xz) = e5a8aa78c475677b11504646da8d93dacc30744258076a2ca418a24438aeb907 diff --git a/xorg-xkill/Pkgfile b/xorg-xkill/Pkgfile index 19de7946..3158f287 100644 --- a/xorg-xkill/Pkgfile +++ b/xorg-xkill/Pkgfile @@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ # Depends on: xorg-libxmu name=xorg-xkill -version=1.0.5 +version=1.0.6 release=1 -source=(https://www.x.org/releases/individual/app/xkill-$version.tar.bz2) +source=(https://www.x.org/releases/individual/app/xkill-$version.tar.xz) build() { cd xkill-$version

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ports/contrib (3.7): glad: 2.0.0 -> 2.0.2
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit 2d4ec02c0af462bb9a536593b3a25a5468258135 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 20:31:40 2022 +0000 glad: 2.0.0 -> 2.0.2 diff --git a/glad/.footprint b/glad/.footprint index 28fa93734..7917b2646 100644 --- a/glad/.footprint +++ b/glad/.footprint @@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad/generator/rust/templa -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad/sink.py -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad/specification.py -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad/util.py -drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/ --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/PKG-INFO --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/SOURCES.txt --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/dependency_links.txt --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/entry_points.txt --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/requires.txt --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.0-py3.10.egg-info/top_level.txt +drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/ +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/PKG-INFO +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/entry_points.txt +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/requires.txt +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/python3.10/site-packages/glad2-2.0.2-py3.10.egg-info/top_level.txt diff --git a/glad/.signature b/glad/.signature index fb5d75666..c54edb630 100644 --- a/glad/.signature +++ b/glad/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF38GN0uEvR7B7yvwrP9m8g3H/MSB2dhW6wWHyoh6alkB/rgjEnqmafl6q4X6Rqr6xBDOYyKeHrZKxayY25MIExA8= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = eece08d727e9a138a1c7fce454d0ebfe6727ac77ed23c0605eab15897679f9e5 -SHA256 (.footprint) = 793e552834f5214674ad49d47a5c7078ec4bd7d4bebd384f336aefde16926aee -SHA256 (glad-2.0.0.tar.gz) = 98977626533c8a58550cc358a8859c17f25c303803d9fa9217b7105c3208aa6c +RWSagIOpLGJF3/Q0QurYZKQxBTLeul4I99j2aJULpUWWqFhUjO/rIxp7xhv+UNC8JxUFS6m3YOe4IVEZ9fu0aluhDT/A9OgwrgI= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = bd4425223b4431bf1d52e42c24a86477e73e7edb39998d79422c04f99f55c4d9 +SHA256 (.footprint) = a264da78d03f4d7f675e1c0c3758ab6ca340421e7e26631be9e28a521ee5437a +SHA256 (glad-2.0.2.tar.gz) = 0326d59b1ccf8ccae1fface5bfb71bec1bb41fbe2341e722b31f6acac3068aeb diff --git a/glad/Pkgfile b/glad/Pkgfile index 0ee998d51..aafaf5b1a 100644 --- a/glad/Pkgfile +++ b/glad/Pkgfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Depends on: python3-jinja2 name=glad -version=2.0.0 +version=2.0.2 release=1 source=(https://github.com/Dav1dde/glad/archive/v$version/$name-$version.ta…

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ports/contrib (3.7): physfs: 3.0.2 -> 3.2.0
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit d10f51ddab8ce92994632f2f1aa28a56fd2c5286 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 20:31:08 2022 +0000 physfs: 3.0.2 -> 3.2.0 diff --git a/physfs/.footprint b/physfs/.footprint index 526310022..e2c4ab26e 100644 --- a/physfs/.footprint +++ b/physfs/.footprint @@ -2,9 +2,13 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/include/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/include/physfs.h drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/ +drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/cmake/ +drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/cmake/PhysFS/ +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/cmake/PhysFS/PhysFSConfig-release.cmake +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/cmake/PhysFS/PhysFSConfig.cmake -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.a lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.so -> libphysfs.so.1 -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.so.1 -> libphysfs.so.3.0.2 --rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.so.3.0.2 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.so.1 -> libphysfs.so.3.2.0 +-rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libphysfs.so.3.2.0 drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/physfs.pc diff --git a/physfs/.signature b/physfs/.signature index c168b8c06..049caba85 100644 --- a/physfs/.signature +++ b/physfs/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF37GYnbB8kZN4ZNDC5fVfvMdo1x4Q1Xk07QW9V7oGJUE9vOAXol0Qd6byp4WU7ji736hNavkWSwx7fFhssfeGNAE= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 87bab208c5b0dd3a4dc2a08650b140e082ea97a2b8ab65a592cb87fa40cae4e7 -SHA256 (.footprint) = 8ba663dcab105d02e7ab226a96784c85f568c7f6300468d917e30dcb5677639b -SHA256 (physfs-3.0.2.tar.bz2) = 304df76206d633df5360e738b138c94e82ccf086e50ba84f456d3f8432f9f863 +RWSagIOpLGJF35kPGrMc9RXSCWnvRi2+kMgt4PYJqhOURJMjRTaoiBLzyKyU7CpIl3FYpcTJpKa5Y10TSmSBuUvDTwflGfnkOQY= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 3950f8977772de1184bf343bf228649e91b5759b29485ccf6ae12c4101de8b5e +SHA256 (.footprint) = 4f2291a031c908a97e63d1351b878d35e49cd533452b9964d02e037e66ee3982 +SHA256 (physfs-3.2.0.tar.gz) = 1991500eaeb8d5325e3a8361847ff3bf8e03ec89252b7915e1f25b3f8ab5d560 diff --git a/physfs/Pkgfile b/physfs/Pkgfile index a9fd7e3e0..2bf2a41af 100644 --- a/physfs/Pkgfile +++ b/physfs/Pkgfile @@ -4,15 +4,14 @@ # Depends on: cmake readline name=physfs -version=3.0.2 +version=3.2.0 release=1 -source=(https://icculus.org/$name/downloads/$name-$version.tar.bz2) +source=(https://github.com/icculus/physfs/archive/release-$version/$name-$version.tar.gz) build() { - [[ -e /usr/bin/ninja ]] && PKGMK_PHYSFS+=' -G Ninja' - - cmake -S $name-$version -B build $PKGMK_PHYSFS \ + cmake -S $name-release-$version -B build -G Ninja $PKGMK_PHYSFS \ -D CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr \ + -D CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR=lib \ -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \ -D CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE="$CXXFLAGS" \ -D CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE="$CFLAGS" \

1 0

ports/contrib (3.7): mkvtoolnix: 71.1.0 -> 72.0.0
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit b61c457233ce496b26d8426a6a4090385e3ed653 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 20:29:33 2022 +0000 mkvtoolnix: 71.1.0 -> 72.0.0 diff --git a/mkvtoolnix/.signature b/mkvtoolnix/.signature index ea721cb83..175a081b0 100644 --- a/mkvtoolnix/.signature +++ b/mkvtoolnix/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF3yBXld2m2o2ocB4K9+mHcWrhZScrdAlfdZYppsrfa+E4K1M4Ya8b9epZ5C251/b61lGGJw2/3Mo/Vyh/b0Tk0QM= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 1a9a1442744c48e94ed346de131a292552336b8957f1e30d6b2c10b8d73d48b2 +RWSagIOpLGJF3/xlRa5emQlQk4PhKuk4zZiGylo4A56LzdFMj62BRfjzTpiO6Wb/vkuSIhZnxOUNEfBiNRtMCTOWr8Ze0JIRRQs= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 66fa0602be281daf4f662c2613f081910bb4177c2b735c097ff0af226d5c8cff SHA256 (.footprint) = 5dd3d6800ce1289994281c545cffe09f7dd989f0ce4f48baab49437c41dfead1 -SHA256 (mkvtoolnix-71.1.0.tar.xz) = 153443e583c29ca9016879dc558503b426494c47934ef8a32265adcb52cfca47 +SHA256 (mkvtoolnix-72.0.0.tar.xz) = 3bd1005baf397f1d70619c2f2c52af9de8ce75995830e790e429c0943fd08000 diff --git a/mkvtoolnix/Pkgfile b/mkvtoolnix/Pkgfile index 3c8d52d64..7c340750e 100644 --- a/mkvtoolnix/Pkgfile +++ b/mkvtoolnix/Pkgfile @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ # Optional: hicolor-icon-theme qt6 name=mkvtoolnix -version=71.1.0 +version=72.0.0 release=1 source=(https://mkvtoolnix.download/sources/$name-$version.tar.xz)

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ports/contrib (3.7): moc: disabled ffmpeg
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit d08e5ab139566515aaab06229e301a5729c8f0f7 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 20:04:58 2022 +0000 moc: disabled ffmpeg diff --git a/moc/.signature b/moc/.signature index cf1c57aef..4a28019ba 100644 --- a/moc/.signature +++ b/moc/.signature @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF3yfuJSSwjfVG12AXVR5YLTiNZJL3WmDkSM0JKKP+SRLGse52u2LH/Z1PJV5Frubtpb2e5VXUYzKyxmogB4WVqgo= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 82e2ac5a37579e1496f40d1751990bbe60aa31c6ee291b0ee12c0b140be65d2e +RWSagIOpLGJF337cTZ+qqVXbAxWhT6u+7gmG1ho5JoGeVdnqalhvD926B9nH+imby23RV1AWQ/CPGVziyj/85ELAycXIMtOcWQ0= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 8986b003d69cbb5aedf7289c88489cc6502d9035ea9a622ef927feb29fe4980d SHA256 (.footprint) = f23b8f049e77b4cb7f95144116ae3c29c790199e1459ff3017dabae044f1b0b2 SHA256 (moc-2.5.2.tar.bz2) = f3a68115602a4788b7cfa9bbe9397a9d5e24c68cb61a57695d1c2c3ecf49db08 SHA256 (moc-ffmpeg4.patch) = f1a12d7d2e8269974487a2ffb011e87d9a6c5c06e2a47d1312d5965c98f050ea diff --git a/moc/Pkgfile b/moc/Pkgfile index 12b3c38f2..1653c1e01 100644 --- a/moc/Pkgfile +++ b/moc/Pkgfile @@ -20,11 +20,12 @@ build() { ./configure \ --prefix=/usr \ + --without-ffmpeg \ --disable-nls \ --disable-debug make make DESTDIR=$PKG install - install -D -m 0644 -t $PKG/usr/share/moc/ config.example keymap.example + install -D -m 0644 -t $PKG/usr/share/moc/ config.example keymap.example rm -rf $PKG/usr/share/doc }

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ports/contrib (3.7): openjdk17-jdk: 17.0.3+7 -> 17.0.6+2
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit 4773be0738f510dca2c77ebc46f839baf0393147 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 19:36:26 2022 +0000 openjdk17-jdk: 17.0.3+7 -> 17.0.6+2 diff --git a/openjdk17-jdk/.signature b/openjdk17-jdk/.signature index b51f6b8ee..e2b18eca8 100644 --- a/openjdk17-jdk/.signature +++ b/openjdk17-jdk/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF34iWO1e8USE1IZb4skADE/KGcqyd3hvaaLu2+1AP2/S1FpDxdL+6M9RLQDzCMhUwl5Z+ECRGnZEfe7OyBJ+ldwQ= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 6e42e642d5743b21d32be2fe23fc5309406abce1cc62811f6fe81b54698cd850 +RWSagIOpLGJF33S1qe6MwFlLvv3mrhBqA3W51UFOvqaHzTpk8G5OJ05hhhweZJ7H2o7pjB+o2lhB+Eg0+2pt+nVykZqRCiQQdQA= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4685feb8d8dc15fa52d14c3df702a00e596bc2131ff727502bd1b512d442e229 SHA256 (.footprint) = aecdd813ca338c3f6e650f1a1b4b54a785e437d251b91b82beb49361d7208373 -SHA256 (openjdk17-jdk-17.0.3+7.tar.gz) = 22575340d080a396442658356583d9c7dc0c44cefa52842fbfcf23eef23c39a0 +SHA256 (openjdk17-jdk-17.0.6+2.tar.gz) = 1ab92f321007df2d2608a77899d1acf457185ca905cb1b303570e16ad576cf3a SHA256 (openjdk17-boot-20211106.tar.xz) = 4c5b27da49f05bbf19223322213c4f430557c64c400a8fe6cb5b9b07e47780c6 SHA256 (java_cacerts-20210916) = 983d71ae2fa404f102fbb7a02e48a56a96459f0d7473026daceef1219045f9de diff --git a/openjdk17-jdk/Pkgfile b/openjdk17-jdk/Pkgfile index f7435b577..3c5d381df 100644 --- a/openjdk17-jdk/Pkgfile +++ b/openjdk17-jdk/Pkgfile @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ # Depends on: alsa-lib cups giflib harfbuzz lcms2 libxslt nss unzip xorg-libxrandr xorg-libxt xorg-libxtst zip name=openjdk17-jdk -version=17.0.3+7 +version=17.0.6+2 _boot_ver=20211106 _cert_ver=20210916 release=1

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ports/contrib (3.7): atkmm: 2.28.2 -> 2.28.3
by crux＠crux.nu 13 Nov '22

13 Nov '22

commit 77861399b6b8562a57d12166d45f1f177b999537 Author: Tim Biermann <tbier(a)posteo.de> Date: Sun Nov 13 18:17:43 2022 +0000 atkmm: 2.28.2 -> 2.28.3 diff --git a/atkmm/.signature b/atkmm/.signature index 1b25f7ffc..05eb91d6b 100644 --- a/atkmm/.signature +++ b/atkmm/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF38Sp+0+jQ3aw4OfLuB8jREFoUVzRX7xjsHsel0BAgt67dOARVlgUY+HXISRKUBhrTkYp0wHrln/uDJfzl0SfGgc= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 6f69de05aae1c2078fda1b6da2a1e7ae00fb42d7e751fb0fe33a5ac2dcd90064 +RWSagIOpLGJF3/O5RZLhA7ov0ifWuho/9//XyukINcGPadzgmSJWkRflX/quTEHnA/KKR9WcN3xV+zxgOZfNCBxg87O/RwAQ7Qk= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 40714bf9563db61ec7fbdb61b779b461ab7a8cb019ccbcd0083c4d45b5a20021 SHA256 (.footprint) = 167030bd87f13e92284d5dff4f1fd96ef11ecaf68b9fb12c7feb61c536f40616 -SHA256 (atkmm-2.28.2.tar.xz) = a0bb49765ceccc293ab2c6735ba100431807d384ffa14c2ebd30e07993fd2fa4 +SHA256 (atkmm-2.28.3.tar.xz) = 7c2088b486a909be8da2b18304e56c5f90884d1343c8da7367ea5cd3258b9969 diff --git a/atkmm/Pkgfile b/atkmm/Pkgfile index d363539bb..2548c298c 100644 --- a/atkmm/Pkgfile +++ b/atkmm/Pkgfile @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # Description: C++ interface for atk # URL: https://www.gtkmm.org/ # Maintainer: Danny Rawlins, crux at romster dot me -# Depends on: glibmm +# Depends on: at-spi2-core glibmm name=atkmm -version=2.28.2 +version=2.28.3 release=1 source=(https://download.gnome.org/sources/$name/${version%.*}/$name-$versi…

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