February 2018 - CRUX - lists.crux.nu

Poppler update breaks texlive
by Xavier 08 Jul '19

08 Jul '19

poppler update to 0.59.0 breaks texlive. I guess it's an upstream problem (see log extract in attachment). I had to revert to poppler 0.57.0

4 7

ports/opt (3.4): [notify] irssi: update to 1.0.7
by crux＠crux.nu 20 Feb '18

20 Feb '18

commit bbd9ee4c6c4f4d80a8e93796af1a71a1a8587350 Author: Juergen Daubert <jue(a)jue.li> Date: Tue Feb 20 15:15:36 2018 +0100 [notify] irssi: update to 1.0.7 several security fixes, see https://irssi.org/security/html/irssi_sa_2018_02/ diff --git a/irssi/.md5sum b/irssi/.md5sum index ff18e093d..74913ccf9 100644 --- a/irssi/.md5sum +++ b/irssi/.md5sum @@ -1 +1 @@ -b7e842c50254b780311cd02e97a3e9b5 irssi-1.0.6.tar.xz +6ebf07a03b58f7af1296cd8fdbb3619f irssi-1.0.7.tar.xz diff --git a/irssi/.signature b/irssi/.signature index a6cea6bc5..7c28f0cbe 100644 --- a/irssi/.signature +++ b/irssi/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub -RWSE3ohX2g5d/ZJ/+ZfG6sK/fOvN+lxnuiZv/kGhUyHF+2cy3pMxOTpjXnntyma4AqbDbuH9HFEpTP0s90ATrzr4kjzZnRp9zQ4= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 11bfb0cd12bf412ec3ff434aa5c3e63d630f569af663ea46938fe86a55248f3f +RWSE3ohX2g5d/T+XNVMgGjZhIra4yva1++zT6FGBOVSNG5ICVdEkijAfTudYotcG7pnUYwsPUCKMXZJMJtYd3NPf4GmA8/liXgk= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = c8abebd6f7162d8b8645923dc8c43b0879d49d2c0af9e8260513761a30d4dfc0 SHA256 (.footprint) = f199f0d812fef6ae7789ed0d4333fb3a4e34a8c37c762ee8cc31387c13b6b187 -SHA256 (irssi-1.0.6.tar.xz) = 029e884f3ebf337f7266d8ed4e1a035ca56d9f85015d74c868b488f279de8585 +SHA256 (irssi-1.0.7.tar.xz) = 1b386ca026aa1875c380fd00ef1d24b71fb87cdae39ef5349ecca16c4567feac diff --git a/irssi/Pkgfile b/irssi/Pkgfile index c53947630..c0fe20171 100644 --- a/irssi/Pkgfile +++ b/irssi/Pkgfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Depends on: glib name=irssi -version=1.0.6 +version=1.0.7 release=1 source=(https://github.com/irssi-import/irssi/releases/download/$version/$n…

1 0

ports/core (3.4): [notify] shadow: fix for CVE-2018-7169, closes FS#1594
by crux＠crux.nu 20 Feb '18

20 Feb '18

commit bff117da3ebcedc486039a8d6644f1481037413e Author: Juergen Daubert <jue(a)jue.li> Date: Tue Feb 20 17:59:28 2018 +0100 [notify] shadow: fix for CVE-2018-7169, closes FS#1594 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 diff --git a/shadow/.md5sum b/shadow/.md5sum index 06f99533..6424e4d5 100644 --- a/shadow/.md5sum +++ b/shadow/.md5sum @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +aad42ace9b3d450717355010b9344c56 CVE-2018-7169.patch 80756b2d5b3351b3757f48ae69fe866d login.defs be8f69c2701118093af3d7f3bc02af16 pwck c350da50c2120de6bb29177699d89fe3 shadow-4.5.tar.xz diff --git a/shadow/.signature b/shadow/.signature index 0711d487..6dbc8777 100644 --- a/shadow/.signature +++ b/shadow/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeqpDsCheU2Flzc0CeEsEe3NNLiW1rztqmJbdJolKG3tJmJXgvIZDG5AmhN6URgAK9BoPhy46gWxv9CRZdtZgMvwU= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 28e4ab2a059acc5972ecbb882d0b08fbe36d8c6b026fc87c150df2d5f06cdc1e +RWRJc1FUaeVeqqLpIS3LGM3rjoF0kUdbtuIDL1UilPze46/DVrHdo27qHiHPLOaN8GLLukQJFkQRq8XV9obslWlWtguLSW/uTwo= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4647cbfe01446ff33de8393e0a6d9dff1a4ac199acd417e66e6623cf6a705507 SHA256 (.footprint) = 196891826eef19be5e249380bc5c9560b10051556be4a3be5d33e099a56f23ae SHA256 (shadow-4.5.tar.xz) = fc8c858381ad577a5c25ff5beb6ee60a34f8719c73e4e7c61e74188b4e54b741 +SHA256 (CVE-2018-7169.patch) = 3b8896d8ac400692af1e2da17b9b8a447aa668c09fe16c1b9cee55e923b64820 SHA256 (pwck) = c62f1bf5785c2bb93bb269156bfa02b06728a01ff5d6c2e09cf6285701a1fda0 SHA256 (login.defs) = a5c63da222b9dd921b60a21be8fc888726b557fd3fde9f60c8899376d0311b0b diff --git a/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch b/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30ad9e61 --- /dev/null +++ b/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai(a)suse.de> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group + +This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a +user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was +created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege +escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from +certain paths. + +This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes +it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which +only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use +that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This +workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set +an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow +administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1). + +We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the +default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they +technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if +the setgroups policy is already "deny". + +Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 +Fixes: CVE-2018-7169 +Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89(a)gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai(a)suse.de> +--- + src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c +index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644 +--- a/src/newgidmap.c ++++ b/src/newgidmap.c +@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@ + */ + const char *Prog; + +-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range) ++ ++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + /* An empty range is invalid */ + if (range->count == 0) + return false; + +- /* Test /etc/subgid */ +- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) ++ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */ ++ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) { ++ *allow_setgroups = true; + return true; ++ } + +- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */ +- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) ++ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */ ++ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) { ++ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */ + return true; ++ } + + return false; + } + + static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges, +- struct map_range *mappings) ++ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + struct map_range *mapping; + int idx; + + mapping = mappings; + for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) { +- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) { ++ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) { + fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"), + Prog, + mapping->upper, +@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void) + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + ++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups) ++{ ++ int setgroups_fd; ++ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096]; ++ ++ /* ++ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't ++ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing ++ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow" ++ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop. ++ */ ++ policy = "deny\n"; ++ if (allow_setgroups) ++ return; ++ ++ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (setgroups_fd < 0) { ++ /* ++ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups ++ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this. ++ */ ++ if (ENOENT == errno) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups ++ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will ++ * fail. ++ */ ++ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Write the policy. */ ++ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ policy, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++out: ++ close(setgroups_fd); ++} ++ + /* + * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process + */ +@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw; + int written; ++ bool allow_setgroups = false; + + Prog = Basename (argv[0]); + +@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + (unsigned long) getuid ())); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } +- ++ + /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */ + if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"), +@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + if (!mappings) + usage(); + +- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings); ++ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups); + ++ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups); + write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map"); + sub_gid_close(); + diff --git a/shadow/Pkgfile b/shadow/Pkgfile index 25870198..e793f3c5 100644 --- a/shadow/Pkgfile +++ b/shadow/Pkgfile @@ -5,13 +5,17 @@ name=shadow version=4.5 -release=1 +release=2 source=(https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/$version/s… + CVE-2018-7169.patch pwck login.defs) build() { cd $name-$version + # https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 + patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2018-7169.patch + ./configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=/etc \ --disable-shared \

1 0

ports/core (3.3): [notify] shadow: fix for CVE-2018-7169, closes FS#1594
by crux＠crux.nu 20 Feb '18

20 Feb '18

commit bff117da3ebcedc486039a8d6644f1481037413e Author: Juergen Daubert <jue(a)jue.li> Date: Tue Feb 20 17:59:28 2018 +0100 [notify] shadow: fix for CVE-2018-7169, closes FS#1594 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 diff --git a/shadow/.md5sum b/shadow/.md5sum index 06f99533..6424e4d5 100644 --- a/shadow/.md5sum +++ b/shadow/.md5sum @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +aad42ace9b3d450717355010b9344c56 CVE-2018-7169.patch 80756b2d5b3351b3757f48ae69fe866d login.defs be8f69c2701118093af3d7f3bc02af16 pwck c350da50c2120de6bb29177699d89fe3 shadow-4.5.tar.xz diff --git a/shadow/.signature b/shadow/.signature index 0711d487..6dbc8777 100644 --- a/shadow/.signature +++ b/shadow/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeqpDsCheU2Flzc0CeEsEe3NNLiW1rztqmJbdJolKG3tJmJXgvIZDG5AmhN6URgAK9BoPhy46gWxv9CRZdtZgMvwU= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 28e4ab2a059acc5972ecbb882d0b08fbe36d8c6b026fc87c150df2d5f06cdc1e +RWRJc1FUaeVeqqLpIS3LGM3rjoF0kUdbtuIDL1UilPze46/DVrHdo27qHiHPLOaN8GLLukQJFkQRq8XV9obslWlWtguLSW/uTwo= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4647cbfe01446ff33de8393e0a6d9dff1a4ac199acd417e66e6623cf6a705507 SHA256 (.footprint) = 196891826eef19be5e249380bc5c9560b10051556be4a3be5d33e099a56f23ae SHA256 (shadow-4.5.tar.xz) = fc8c858381ad577a5c25ff5beb6ee60a34f8719c73e4e7c61e74188b4e54b741 +SHA256 (CVE-2018-7169.patch) = 3b8896d8ac400692af1e2da17b9b8a447aa668c09fe16c1b9cee55e923b64820 SHA256 (pwck) = c62f1bf5785c2bb93bb269156bfa02b06728a01ff5d6c2e09cf6285701a1fda0 SHA256 (login.defs) = a5c63da222b9dd921b60a21be8fc888726b557fd3fde9f60c8899376d0311b0b diff --git a/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch b/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..30ad9e61 --- /dev/null +++ b/shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai(a)suse.de> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group + +This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a +user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was +created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege +escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from +certain paths. + +This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes +it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which +only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use +that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This +workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set +an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow +administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1). + +We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the +default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they +technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if +the setgroups policy is already "deny". + +Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 +Fixes: CVE-2018-7169 +Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89(a)gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai(a)suse.de> +--- + src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c +index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644 +--- a/src/newgidmap.c ++++ b/src/newgidmap.c +@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@ + */ + const char *Prog; + +-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range) ++ ++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + /* An empty range is invalid */ + if (range->count == 0) + return false; + +- /* Test /etc/subgid */ +- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) ++ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */ ++ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) { ++ *allow_setgroups = true; + return true; ++ } + +- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */ +- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) ++ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */ ++ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) { ++ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */ + return true; ++ } + + return false; + } + + static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges, +- struct map_range *mappings) ++ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups) + { + struct map_range *mapping; + int idx; + + mapping = mappings; + for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) { +- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) { ++ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) { + fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"), + Prog, + mapping->upper, +@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void) + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + ++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups) ++{ ++ int setgroups_fd; ++ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096]; ++ ++ /* ++ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't ++ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing ++ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow" ++ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop. ++ */ ++ policy = "deny\n"; ++ if (allow_setgroups) ++ return; ++ ++ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC); ++ if (setgroups_fd < 0) { ++ /* ++ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups ++ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this. ++ */ ++ if (ENOENT == errno) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups ++ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will ++ * fail. ++ */ ++ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy))) ++ goto out; ++ ++ /* Write the policy. */ ++ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"), ++ Prog, ++ policy, ++ strerror(errno)); ++ exit(EXIT_FAILURE); ++ } ++ ++out: ++ close(setgroups_fd); ++} ++ + /* + * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process + */ +@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw; + int written; ++ bool allow_setgroups = false; + + Prog = Basename (argv[0]); + +@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + (unsigned long) getuid ())); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } +- ++ + /* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */ + if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"), +@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + if (!mappings) + usage(); + +- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings); ++ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups); + ++ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups); + write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map"); + sub_gid_close(); + diff --git a/shadow/Pkgfile b/shadow/Pkgfile index 25870198..e793f3c5 100644 --- a/shadow/Pkgfile +++ b/shadow/Pkgfile @@ -5,13 +5,17 @@ name=shadow version=4.5 -release=1 +release=2 source=(https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/$version/s… + CVE-2018-7169.patch pwck login.defs) build() { cd $name-$version + # https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357 + patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2018-7169.patch + ./configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=/etc \ --disable-shared \

1 0

ports/opt (3.3): [notify] irssi: update to 1.0.7
by crux＠crux.nu 20 Feb '18

20 Feb '18

commit bbd9ee4c6c4f4d80a8e93796af1a71a1a8587350 Author: Juergen Daubert <jue(a)jue.li> Date: Tue Feb 20 15:15:36 2018 +0100 [notify] irssi: update to 1.0.7 several security fixes, see https://irssi.org/security/html/irssi_sa_2018_02/ diff --git a/irssi/.md5sum b/irssi/.md5sum index ff18e093d..74913ccf9 100644 --- a/irssi/.md5sum +++ b/irssi/.md5sum @@ -1 +1 @@ -b7e842c50254b780311cd02e97a3e9b5 irssi-1.0.6.tar.xz +6ebf07a03b58f7af1296cd8fdbb3619f irssi-1.0.7.tar.xz diff --git a/irssi/.signature b/irssi/.signature index a6cea6bc5..7c28f0cbe 100644 --- a/irssi/.signature +++ b/irssi/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub -RWSE3ohX2g5d/ZJ/+ZfG6sK/fOvN+lxnuiZv/kGhUyHF+2cy3pMxOTpjXnntyma4AqbDbuH9HFEpTP0s90ATrzr4kjzZnRp9zQ4= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 11bfb0cd12bf412ec3ff434aa5c3e63d630f569af663ea46938fe86a55248f3f +RWSE3ohX2g5d/T+XNVMgGjZhIra4yva1++zT6FGBOVSNG5ICVdEkijAfTudYotcG7pnUYwsPUCKMXZJMJtYd3NPf4GmA8/liXgk= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = c8abebd6f7162d8b8645923dc8c43b0879d49d2c0af9e8260513761a30d4dfc0 SHA256 (.footprint) = f199f0d812fef6ae7789ed0d4333fb3a4e34a8c37c762ee8cc31387c13b6b187 -SHA256 (irssi-1.0.6.tar.xz) = 029e884f3ebf337f7266d8ed4e1a035ca56d9f85015d74c868b488f279de8585 +SHA256 (irssi-1.0.7.tar.xz) = 1b386ca026aa1875c380fd00ef1d24b71fb87cdae39ef5349ecca16c4567feac diff --git a/irssi/Pkgfile b/irssi/Pkgfile index c53947630..c0fe20171 100644 --- a/irssi/Pkgfile +++ b/irssi/Pkgfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Depends on: glib name=irssi -version=1.0.6 +version=1.0.7 release=1 source=(https://github.com/irssi-import/irssi/releases/download/$version/$n…

1 0

ports/contrib (3.4): [notify] go: updated to version 1.9.4
by crux＠crux.nu 12 Feb '18

12 Feb '18

commit d326a4ba9149632531cbcfa0af3dd3733220d452 Author: Matt Housh <jaeger(a)crux.ninja> Date: Thu Feb 8 23:48:42 2018 -0600 [notify] go: updated to version 1.9.4 Security fix for "go get", see https://github.com/golang/go/issues/23673 diff --git a/go/.footprint b/go/.footprint index cfdd0fbb..649b78d6 100644 --- a/go/.footprint +++ b/go/.footprint @@ -2114,6 +2114,8 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/web/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/build.go -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/build_test.go +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/security.go +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/security_test.go -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/internal/work/testgo.go -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/main.go -rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/go/src/cmd/go/mkalldocs.sh diff --git a/go/.md5sum b/go/.md5sum index beb99b46..26a526d8 100644 --- a/go/.md5sum +++ b/go/.md5sum @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ a121383b430da9050355544d132d8630 go-certpath.diff 814fad4ac7dedfb5e286df83cdc7fc21 go1.4.3.linux-amd64.tar.gz -dcb87e20c314ff08205afcb4ee048d71 go1.9.3.src.tar.gz +6816441fd6680c63865cdd5cb8bc1960 go1.9.4.src.tar.gz diff --git a/go/.signature b/go/.signature index 0deb5bf0..0c89aa0a 100644 --- a/go/.signature +++ b/go/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF37EJyK3sCKZNvvlF5FfK6+YRNxBmnzSKHiONvY6CsHdK07jy5rcvDg/Wr82e78VCtKTPOGb9Mgvzq+DWIScVigI= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 484809b62aeee8fa8d259857b11cc9706bf4b3f3093fb77544239718401ef30e -SHA256 (.footprint) = 70916de2a012b0e1ae2342901b4030d6015aa4230ec5d1a15d69acc0cfb14860 +RWSagIOpLGJF360HLXusbweeoPBrS1djP2KZysE/G2P6uC4c1keSjMSSbQVcDbOv41STVkNAF337gruvfY6nsGv7sPVMB5qq2QY= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = c728261af4686ac7c217b09e01b71c3027ea5195f069c78c87327a5c45673c0c +SHA256 (.footprint) = 89cb54f2c0d8d236f309d5bcc5e9d1dd7d641dcb4902e829d6be3f9ebcb06393 SHA256 (go1.4.3.linux-amd64.tar.gz) = ce3140662f45356eb78bc16a88fc7cfb29fb00e18d7c632608245b789b2086d2 -SHA256 (go1.9.3.src.tar.gz) = 4e3d0ad6e91e02efa77d54e86c8b9e34fbe1cbc2935b6d38784dca93331c47ae +SHA256 (go1.9.4.src.tar.gz) = 0573a8df33168977185aa44173305e5a0450f55213600e94541604b75d46dc06 SHA256 (go-certpath.diff) = 3907aed875a3d4e19dfb9aa2aa5b6c4aea821637c8d6f0dd0af54a4e99e8309f diff --git a/go/Pkgfile b/go/Pkgfile index 251a5718..86fa7353 100644 --- a/go/Pkgfile +++ b/go/Pkgfile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: Matt Housh, jaeger at crux dot ninja name=go -version=1.9.3 +version=1.9.4 release=1 source=(https://storage.googleapis.com/golang/go1.4.3.linux-amd64.tar.gz \ https://storage.googleapis.com/golang/${name}${version}.src.tar.gz \

1 0

ports/contrib (3.4): [notify] sakura: 2.4.2 -> 3.5.0 changed dependency vte -> vte3 closes FS#1128
by crux＠crux.nu 12 Feb '18

12 Feb '18

commit d9d00d85886a4a0434464208545ca46dff63d0db Author: Danny Rawlins <monster.romster(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Feb 10 12:59:30 2018 +1100 [notify] sakura: 2.4.2 -> 3.5.0 changed dependency vte -> vte3 closes FS#1128 diff --git a/sakura/.footprint b/sakura/.footprint index ed23f403..ff5c530c 100644 --- a/sakura/.footprint +++ b/sakura/.footprint @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/bin/ -rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/bin/sakura -drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/man/ -drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/man/man1/ --rw-r--r-- root/root usr/man/man1/sakura.1.gz drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/applications/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/share/applications/sakura.desktop +drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/man/ +drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/man/man1/ +-rw-r--r-- root/root usr/share/man/man1/sakura.1.gz drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/pixmaps/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/share/pixmaps/terminal-tango.svg diff --git a/sakura/.md5sum b/sakura/.md5sum index 948c81af..b4033770 100644 --- a/sakura/.md5sum +++ b/sakura/.md5sum @@ -1 +1 @@ -46669519c77f7402b2de24cdefe251bb sakura-2.4.2.tar.bz2 +5ac5229d2c9eb65bf42062ea41fec9c9 sakura-3.5.0.tar.bz2 diff --git a/sakura/.signature b/sakura/.signature index bb5e6164..c458b64d 100644 --- a/sakura/.signature +++ b/sakura/.signature @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/contrib.pub -RWSagIOpLGJF3888074NgK3VqvzEQPCZN/G+Isw7opTX12O1ynpUPx/anaJAbH+CM8wGC1slQ6xX7EWyNY2OJanlNA7rMDJFfwI= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = d23c05f859758b4e3290cf18cf9e07cf9e70fb5a44f55971405a81090495c2d8 -SHA256 (.footprint) = ca8496e7ca74f35b62de20e81de57578d92d7b6d839f332c48fa0404abf643f4 -SHA256 (sakura-2.4.2.tar.bz2) = c5e6242ca4afba3ad43731939f7d2a728bd40056a93de50f34e5bf76a696fad6 +RWSagIOpLGJF3yCQZ5DOzzayjWzc6cZ0YzllJFUaWymWWxrGYNeTma1exZRASFpa54vad/o/a3vSE27GjTteAh00KsrhXPFpkwI= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 2e8d087ae1b1a546153d6281209cfe9c480527820910641d6c1f1ef6faf05ade +SHA256 (.footprint) = 329496cfa310c07f4b8f63ec1a6a69e2dbcc82825f430df777108d134d8a6979 +SHA256 (sakura-3.5.0.tar.bz2) = eb30ede41083fda2b07c6a3b7393150f48867e81d28ef70b15824740cab00c3a diff --git a/sakura/Pkgfile b/sakura/Pkgfile index 2bdfab10..022ec5fb 100644 --- a/sakura/Pkgfile +++ b/sakura/Pkgfile @@ -1,19 +1,20 @@ # Description: A terminal emulator based on GTK and VTE. # URL: http://www.pleyades.net/david/projects/sakura # Maintainer: Danny Rawlins, crux at romster dot me -# Packager: Danny Rawlins, crux at romster dot me -# Depends on: vte cmake libidn +# Depends on: vte3 cmake libidn name=sakura -version=2.4.2 +version=3.5.0 release=1 -source=(http://launchpad.net/sakura/trunk/$version/+download/$name-$version.tar.bz2) +source=(https://launchpad.net/sakura/trunk/$version/+download/$name-$version.tar.bz2) build() { cd $name-$version + cmake -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/usr -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RELEASE . + make make DESTDIR=$PKG install - mv $PKG/usr/share/man $PKG/usr/man + rm -r $PKG/usr/share/{locale,doc} }

1 0

ports/core (3.4): [notify] exim: updated to 4.90.1. Fix for CVE-2018-6789.
by crux＠crux.nu 10 Feb '18

10 Feb '18

commit 3beabba73321968a3d9f0e4438deec4e8c348382 Author: Fredrik Rinnestam <fredrik(a)crux.nu> Date: Sat Feb 10 20:50:07 2018 +0100 [notify] exim: updated to 4.90.1. Fix for CVE-2018-6789. http://exim.org/static/doc/security/CVE-2018-6789.txt diff --git a/exim/.md5sum b/exim/.md5sum index 2dca3bb4..00faa338 100644 --- a/exim/.md5sum +++ b/exim/.md5sum @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ 2e73c992dc8491a33f225efbe4da9e32 exim -02aad0b2692968ba7ea96d6e4253b898 exim-4.90.tar.xz +0095c67c9954a51c67424a11e429ebc7 exim-4.90.1.tar.xz 72ba403540397ecbb17c6a87fcc685ef exim-config.patch diff --git a/exim/.signature b/exim/.signature index 18d67471..b11ae022 100644 --- a/exim/.signature +++ b/exim/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeql2fj67k4Y52I4vHExGMk1HhRpQ2aWXVIkImBIBNyuD7vKvhxCRkUMaeZIOi8Ujg1AIkw1EYpGYOxGXWtSCVaAo= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = f104a972554a6bed656a67130130c55439808703b581b364e84257ab6c167cce +RWRJc1FUaeVeqs8mcChRSCeLp6ZhIbdPkZWgNAOwhchBCIbqH+0ZiUOFMU502cT4u7aVEfTQrxMrf0Wr8wOk2bjg8vm4yCmzWAE= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 031e9763a33c40f959c475fc114470e22f7fb3c446ddcea1746484af28b88072 SHA256 (.footprint) = 3e5fe8471a7a9057c0c7486c016ea2ed1dc5ebd72adc13c23f432ef468d2fc5d -SHA256 (exim-4.90.tar.xz) = 93548b529d0301629106001d73611c6098a676733f742f61ef626f1fb3f23a80 +SHA256 (exim-4.90.1.tar.xz) = 5c98dfd12043be5751b88ef64d5363cd99284236eaeec6316b062a7628c2f726 SHA256 (exim) = 850f72cb4d069dc8d15ce138623e6b6a7fe33f5daebe37fbf93c7801fa2d6134 SHA256 (exim-config.patch) = 6c6737eade01065c46173bff45fac3cf391e3a78f3c68f84b20e2b1a1ea0b120 diff --git a/exim/Pkgfile b/exim/Pkgfile index 10aad498..66480966 100644 --- a/exim/Pkgfile +++ b/exim/Pkgfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Depends on: db openssl libpcre name=exim -version=4.90 +version=4.90.1 release=1 source=(ftp://ftp.exim.org/pub/exim/exim4/$name-$version.tar.xz \ $name $name-config.patch)

1 0

ports/core (3.3): [notify] exim: updated to 4.90.1. Fix for CVE-2018-6789.
by crux＠crux.nu 10 Feb '18

10 Feb '18

commit 3beabba73321968a3d9f0e4438deec4e8c348382 Author: Fredrik Rinnestam <fredrik(a)crux.nu> Date: Sat Feb 10 20:50:07 2018 +0100 [notify] exim: updated to 4.90.1. Fix for CVE-2018-6789. http://exim.org/static/doc/security/CVE-2018-6789.txt diff --git a/exim/.md5sum b/exim/.md5sum index 2dca3bb4..00faa338 100644 --- a/exim/.md5sum +++ b/exim/.md5sum @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ 2e73c992dc8491a33f225efbe4da9e32 exim -02aad0b2692968ba7ea96d6e4253b898 exim-4.90.tar.xz +0095c67c9954a51c67424a11e429ebc7 exim-4.90.1.tar.xz 72ba403540397ecbb17c6a87fcc685ef exim-config.patch diff --git a/exim/.signature b/exim/.signature index 18d67471..b11ae022 100644 --- a/exim/.signature +++ b/exim/.signature @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub -RWRJc1FUaeVeql2fj67k4Y52I4vHExGMk1HhRpQ2aWXVIkImBIBNyuD7vKvhxCRkUMaeZIOi8Ujg1AIkw1EYpGYOxGXWtSCVaAo= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = f104a972554a6bed656a67130130c55439808703b581b364e84257ab6c167cce +RWRJc1FUaeVeqs8mcChRSCeLp6ZhIbdPkZWgNAOwhchBCIbqH+0ZiUOFMU502cT4u7aVEfTQrxMrf0Wr8wOk2bjg8vm4yCmzWAE= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 031e9763a33c40f959c475fc114470e22f7fb3c446ddcea1746484af28b88072 SHA256 (.footprint) = 3e5fe8471a7a9057c0c7486c016ea2ed1dc5ebd72adc13c23f432ef468d2fc5d -SHA256 (exim-4.90.tar.xz) = 93548b529d0301629106001d73611c6098a676733f742f61ef626f1fb3f23a80 +SHA256 (exim-4.90.1.tar.xz) = 5c98dfd12043be5751b88ef64d5363cd99284236eaeec6316b062a7628c2f726 SHA256 (exim) = 850f72cb4d069dc8d15ce138623e6b6a7fe33f5daebe37fbf93c7801fa2d6134 SHA256 (exim-config.patch) = 6c6737eade01065c46173bff45fac3cf391e3a78f3c68f84b20e2b1a1ea0b120 diff --git a/exim/Pkgfile b/exim/Pkgfile index 10aad498..66480966 100644 --- a/exim/Pkgfile +++ b/exim/Pkgfile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Depends on: db openssl libpcre name=exim -version=4.90 +version=4.90.1 release=1 source=(ftp://ftp.exim.org/pub/exim/exim4/$name-$version.tar.xz \ $name $name-config.patch)

1 0

ports/opt (3.4): [notify] vte3: 0.48.2 -> 0.50.2 closes FS#1584
by crux＠crux.nu 10 Feb '18

10 Feb '18

commit 90495776fdafd898bb399b7a4a0339b082605f9e Author: Danny Rawlins <monster.romster(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Feb 10 12:20:54 2018 +1100 [notify] vte3: 0.48.2 -> 0.50.2 closes FS#1584 diff --git a/vte3/.footprint b/vte3/.footprint index 604fc841c..346ce0ee0 100644 --- a/vte3/.footprint +++ b/vte3/.footprint @@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/ drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/girepository-1.0/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/girepository-1.0/Vte-2.91.typelib -rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.la -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so -> libvte-2.91.so.0.4800.2 -lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so.0 -> libvte-2.91.so.0.4800.2 --rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so.0.4800.2 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so -> libvte-2.91.so.0.5000.2 +lrwxrwxrwx root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so.0 -> libvte-2.91.so.0.5000.2 +-rwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/libvte-2.91.so.0.5000.2 drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/ -rw-r--r-- root/root usr/lib/pkgconfig/vte-2.91.pc drwxr-xr-x root/root usr/share/ diff --git a/vte3/.md5sum b/vte3/.md5sum index 44ff4e5c5..7a32079f3 100644 --- a/vte3/.md5sum +++ b/vte3/.md5sum @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ -bc0601624af5668df5cd37e3fe1237b2 vte-0.48.2.tar.xz -90efc55c080484424464ad928929f642 vte-metamask.patch +1912cfd1d9cdd30cebeb908507acadc5 vte-0.50.2.tar.xz +8ff05b81c3990226dcae181061ecc0f1 vte3-790536.patch +163e1c353661948ab0084ff98c7f42a8 vte3-790539.patch +c37be9686f948b553947a57abf2435de vte3-pty_memory_leak.patch diff --git a/vte3/.signature b/vte3/.signature index 18fccdb73..8a916e877 100644 --- a/vte3/.signature +++ b/vte3/.signature @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub -RWSE3ohX2g5d/YulPh555LNty+FIPcmsM0fU5lyjNLnTRIfT9u5jYkZUEYO5c+44YsCsidPUr82+W/E+C8uaErXpj0mGyuGSuww= -SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 46ffeabdb5adde3258572353154e222d88e3a9ca12f0afa920826589e5c2252d -SHA256 (.footprint) = d56c6b068bb60fbf729019017be83d03081c373702583313e32e12c95c6faf3d -SHA256 (vte-0.48.2.tar.xz) = c278b301edfe38b43baec1bccc86e225dacea5b670a96ca7ea55ca9a4b030690 -SHA256 (vte-metamask.patch) = 0432074528c49f5399e45c774274332d06e28f5668e116093c3aaebddf31c381 +RWSE3ohX2g5d/V5YEX87WUO0Xm5C7QyMihZttUb9YYAZn/5pk1MipBaK3YkoxBCzjQnJFO907tJcBP6NsSIv1COm5bHLKeuB2QA= +SHA256 (Pkgfile) = cd2e804445aba24a0dd8d4e17dfd385648832565cb03349ba89e1d325c3526ff +SHA256 (.footprint) = b2debc514eaa50397750caa45b88dfad49a31daa00cd7d999fd41aafde53ce08 +SHA256 (vte-0.50.2.tar.xz) = 79dd316bfaff48f2fb74d066baae0d830e1f44436796fe410a57297e5c5f09cf +SHA256 (vte3-790539.patch) = bd3aaec0ceaa47948160a016f1eaaabf783df7771932a335448a060882ec97e4 +SHA256 (vte3-pty_memory_leak.patch) = b7e57d7e5e40a75eb5f409f163adc649f1c040d4f9c0594ddc1369aea45df291 +SHA256 (vte3-790536.patch) = 9d0561dc8e8bb46b936d31b8265a42bed0d112d36a734ebe11fcff7aa9be1be4 diff --git a/vte3/Pkgfile b/vte3/Pkgfile index 7ac596c99..52e5c4bc6 100644 --- a/vte3/Pkgfile +++ b/vte3/Pkgfile @@ -1,27 +1,40 @@ # Description: Virtual Terminal Emulator widget for use with GTK3 # URL: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Terminal/VTE # Maintainer: Danny Rawlins, crux at romster dot me -# Depends on: gtk3 gnutls libpcre2 +# Depends on: gnutls gtk3 libgmp libpcre2 util-linux name=vte3 -version=0.48.2 +version=0.50.2 release=1 -source=(ftp://ftp.gnome.org/pub/gnome/sources/vte/${version%.*}/vte-$version.tar.xz \ - vte-metamask.patch) +source=(https://download.gnome.org/sources/vte/${version%.*}/vte-$version.tar.xz + $name-790539.patch + $name-pty_memory_leak.patch + $name-790536.patch) build() { - cd vte-$version + cd vte-$version - patch -R -p1 -i $SRC/vte-metamask.patch + # https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790539 + # https://git.gnome.org/browse/vte/commit/?h=vte-0-50&id=1d200a63ac4e39035af3… + patch -p1 -i $SRC/$name-790539.patch - ./configure --prefix=/usr \ - --libexecdir=/usr/lib/vte \ - --disable-static \ - --disable-gtk-doc \ - --enable-vala=no + # pty: Fix memory leak + # https://git.gnome.org/browse/vte/commit/?h=vte-0-50&id=ddd6dc998d9842369ec2… + patch -p1 -i $SRC/$name-pty_memory_leak.patch - make - make DESTDIR=$PKG install + # https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790536 + # https://git.gnome.org/browse/vte/commit/?h=vte-0-50&id=504db1b97f684778ee52… + patch -p1 -i $SRC/$name-790536.patch - rm -rf $PKG/usr/share/{gtk-doc,locale} + ./configure \ + --prefix=/usr \ + --libexecdir=/usr/lib/vte \ + --disable-static \ + --disable-gtk-doc \ + --enable-vala=no + + make + make DESTDIR=$PKG install + + rm -r $PKG/usr/share/{gtk-doc,locale} } diff --git a/vte3/vte-metamask.patch b/vte3/vte-metamask.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9423d94f8..000000000 --- a/vte3/vte-metamask.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -From b73782a28894e25ed146271f9d6c6775a6836199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Behdad Esfahbod <behdad(a)behdad.org> -Date: Fri, 04 Jun 2010 18:36:45 +0000 -Subject: Bug 601926 - Don't hardcode meta to alt - ---- -diff --git a/src/keymap.h b/src/keymap.h -index 3a4cefe..243e22e 100644 ---- a/src/keymap.h -+++ b/src/keymap.h -@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ - - G_BEGIN_DECLS - --#define VTE_META_MASK GDK_MOD1_MASK -+#define VTE_META_MASK GDK_META_MASK - #define VTE_NUMLOCK_MASK GDK_MOD2_MASK - - /* Map the specified keyval/modifier setup, dependent on the mode, to either --- diff --git a/vte3/vte3-790536.patch b/vte3/vte3-790536.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..097ee775f --- /dev/null +++ b/vte3/vte3-790536.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 504db1b97f684778ee52f6e280a9e734936be20f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Egmont Koblinger <egmont(a)gmail.com> +Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 20:50:06 +0100 +Subject: widget: Reset might need to start blinking the cursor + +https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790536 +(cherry picked from commit f6678e7e938aaf6f4fd72ceb8f1bb71b2bf3e69e) +--- + src/vte.cc | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/vte.cc b/src/vte.cc +index 6f28670..a9f73e2 100644 +--- a/src/vte.cc ++++ b/src/vte.cc +@@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ VteTerminalPrivate::reset(bool clear_tabstops, + adjust_adjustments_full(); + } + /* DECSCUSR cursor style */ +- m_cursor_style = VTE_CURSOR_STYLE_TERMINAL_DEFAULT; ++ set_cursor_style(VTE_CURSOR_STYLE_TERMINAL_DEFAULT); + /* Do more stuff we refer to as a "full" reset. */ + if (clear_tabstops) { + set_default_tabstops(); +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/vte3/vte3-790539.patch b/vte3/vte3-790539.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ebcfa0f8a --- /dev/null +++ b/vte3/vte3-790539.patch @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 1d200a63ac4e39035af35e80881aa4fdae5556c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Persch <chpe(a)src.gnome.org> +Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 18:40:03 +0100 +Subject: matcher: Fix memory leak + +Don't leak the GValueArray. + +https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=790539 +(cherry picked from commit dda73cc07250ea324b4227907197c39b93fcd365) +--- + src/matcher.cc | 12 +++++++----- + src/table.cc | 19 +++++++++++-------- + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/matcher.cc b/src/matcher.cc +index 10f3bc7..a4f7584 100644 +--- a/src/matcher.cc ++++ b/src/matcher.cc +@@ -202,14 +202,16 @@ _vte_matcher_print(struct _vte_matcher *matcher) + * we need to free those ourselves. */ + void + _vte_matcher_free_params_array(struct _vte_matcher *matcher, +- GValueArray *params) ++ GValueArray *params) + { + guint i; + for (i = 0; i < params->n_values; i++) { +- GValue *value = &params->values[i]; +- if (G_UNLIKELY (g_type_is_a (value->g_type, G_TYPE_POINTER))) { +- g_free (g_value_get_pointer (value)); +- } ++ auto value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i); ++ if (G_UNLIKELY (G_VALUE_HOLDS_POINTER(value))) { ++ g_free(g_value_get_pointer(value)); ++ } else if (G_UNLIKELY (G_VALUE_HOLDS_BOXED(value))) { ++ g_value_array_free((GValueArray*)g_value_get_boxed(value)); ++ } + } + if (G_UNLIKELY (matcher == NULL || matcher->free_params != NULL)) { + g_value_array_free (params); +diff --git a/src/table.cc b/src/table.cc +index 3c78f3a..09a6172 100644 +--- a/src/table.cc ++++ b/src/table.cc +@@ -516,18 +516,14 @@ static void + _vte_table_extract_numbers(GValueArray **array, + struct _vte_table_arginfo *arginfo) + { +- GValue value = {0,}; +- GValue subvalue = {0,}; +- GValueArray *subarray = NULL; +- gssize i; +- + if (G_UNLIKELY (*array == NULL)) { + *array = g_value_array_new(1); + } + ++ GValue value = {0,}; + g_value_init(&value, G_TYPE_LONG); +- g_value_init(&subvalue, G_TYPE_VALUE_ARRAY); +- i = 0; ++ gssize i = 0; ++ GValueArray *subarray = nullptr; + do { + long total = 0; + for (; i < arginfo->length && arginfo->start[i] != ';' && arginfo->start[i] != ':'; i++) { +@@ -546,13 +542,20 @@ _vte_table_extract_numbers(GValueArray **array, + g_value_array_append(*array, &value); + } else { + g_value_array_append(subarray, &value); +- g_value_set_boxed(&subvalue, subarray); ++ ++ GValue subvalue = {0,}; ++ g_value_init(&subvalue, G_TYPE_VALUE_ARRAY); ++ g_value_take_boxed(&subvalue, subarray); + g_value_array_append(*array, &subvalue); ++ g_value_unset(&subvalue); ++ + subarray = NULL; + } + } + } while (i++ < arginfo->length); + g_value_unset(&value); ++ if (subarray != nullptr) ++ g_value_array_free(subarray); + } + + static void +-- +cgit v0.12 + diff --git a/vte3/vte3-pty_memory_leak.patch b/vte3/vte3-pty_memory_leak.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e82ec89ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vte3/vte3-pty_memory_leak.patch @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From ddd6dc998d9842369ec20f8e83c380401a8aed02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Persch <chpe(a)src.gnome.org> +Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 19:10:10 +0100 +Subject: pty: Fix mem leak + +(cherry picked from commit 304e29d8a603828f42410ceac39ad803fcac475b) +--- + src/pty.cc | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/pty.cc b/src/pty.cc +index c1741d2..0c0b001 100644 +--- a/src/pty.cc ++++ b/src/pty.cc +@@ -1200,5 +1200,7 @@ vte_pty_spawn_finish(VtePty *pty, + *child_pid = *(GPid*)pidptr; + if (error) + *error = nullptr; ++ ++ g_free(pidptr); + return TRUE; + } +-- +cgit v0.12 +

1 0