ports/opt (3.4): [notify] wpa_supplicant: security fix for CVE-2018-14526

crux at crux.nu crux at crux.nu
Mon Aug 20 16:21:17 UTC 2018


commit ffe0c53f2ba0ba9c87065f5f90a9b874000681c3
Author: Juergen Daubert <jue at jue.li>
Date:   Mon Aug 20 18:20:06 2018 +0200

    [notify] wpa_supplicant: security fix for CVE-2018-14526
    
    see
    https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt

diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/.md5sum b/wpa_supplicant/.md5sum
index 660019c37..713d0ddbd 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/.md5sum
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/.md5sum
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+5cc415c6b43d12c049d76ecef0449679  rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 a209fe1510a138c0da3855854c38bf6f  rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
 a19510a630e870a100ccb56627df38b9  rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
 1f9054638b4b142049aec620307e5bd2  rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/.signature b/wpa_supplicant/.signature
index b44a5da65..d18caae8d 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/.signature
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/.signature
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub
-RWSE3ohX2g5d/RQg80Uz1Uy8/Bmifa5WGQsdDvlhpP0B/f7QXNBbntGkSjOBRzIvuuCD5bHTgtmDSqyR5n964zy4w19JVo4Seg0=
-SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4b52b01a677225157876b502c8de725da63c7a5b1ff55469905f502783b73da3
+RWSE3ohX2g5d/fb0pwxIzrpCLcq+WA+NjAfAFaG0XqredE1sAUGZ3W8EWJ4i2/a+WihNbsX4ee8bigW1Ei1vwAi3lYeQZ4+EUQY=
+SHA256 (Pkgfile) = fb42fc05015785f706392ac8a2a89b6cf042113af596bc62c330780e1452f8f1
 SHA256 (.footprint) = d3b2e0c4068fe789ca0c18c2c81faf906efdbd970fa00641c3e5381dcbc474a5
 SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450
 SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch) = 529113cc81256c6178f3c1cf25dd8d3f33e6d770e4a180bd31c6ab7e4917f40b
@@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch) = 147
 SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch) = 596d4d3b63ea859ed7ea9791b3a21cb11b6173b04c0a14a2afa47edf1666afa6
 SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch) = c5a17af84aec2d88c56ce0da2d6945be398fe7cab5c0c340deb30973900c2736
 SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch) = c8840d857b9432f3b488113c85c1ff5d4a4b8d81078b7033388dae1e990843b1
+SHA256 (rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch) = 960c3cf2a514479b0b4cf09665186a1a9f5d28e8b05dec23db75c6cc13eb1f7c
 SHA256 (wlan) = 62f4c0bf8d5fedcf5b6ad79278f4be16f29841099f385acc4fc91e2d52ca1927
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Pkgfile b/wpa_supplicant/Pkgfile
index ede524d6e..6231790d9 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Pkgfile
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Pkgfile
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 name=wpa_supplicant
 version=2.6
-release=3
+release=4
 source=(http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/$name-$version.tar.gz
         rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
         rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ source=(http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/$name-$version.tar.gz
         rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
         rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
         rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+        rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
         wlan)
 
 build () {
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ build () {
     patch -d.. -p1 -i $SRC/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
     patch -d.. -p1 -i $SRC/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
     patch -d.. -p1 -i $SRC/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+    patch -d.. -p1 -i $SRC/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 
     cp defconfig .config
     echo "CONFIG_READLINE=y
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a62b52c6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef at cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c	2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+ 
+ 	if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ 	    (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++		/*
++		 * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++		 * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++		 * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++		 * which is the case in this code branch.
++		 */
++		if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++				"WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ 						    &key_data_len))
+ 			goto out;


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